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Commercial Bribery: Choice and
Measurement Within a Remedies
Smorgasbord
Doug Rendleman∗
Abstract
Searching for the most suitable money remedy for a simple
commercial bribe promptly lands a lawyer, judge, professor,
student, or researcher in a remedial smorgasbord. Deemphasizing injunctions, commercial bribery offers a spectrum of
monetary remedies.
The plaintiff has two defendants, the briber and the bribee.
He has two major remedies, damages and restitution. The
overlapping policies consist of compensating the plaintiff,
preventing the defendants’ unjust enrichment, deterring the
defendants and others, and punishing the defendants. Courts
implement these policies with compensatory damages, restitution,
and punitive damages. A bribe can be returned as damages or
restitution, a significant distinction. Punishment points the
court’s remedial compass at punitive damages. The law
distinguishes between legal restitution and equitable restitution.
Equitable restitution distinguishes between constructive trust and
accounting-disgorgement; if a defendant has other creditors, the
distinction takes center stage. Recovery from the briber adds the
possibility of duplication. The possibilities of confusion and excess
lurk in the wings.
Bribery is a private law-public law hybrid; commercial
bribery is on the private law side. Commercial bribery plays a role
in three recent Restatements; Employment, Restitution, and
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Agency. Courts in the United States cite persuasive authority from
other common-law jurisdictions to fill gaps in local positive law.
Domestic courts may learn from others about alternative solutions
to shared problems. Some differences, for example, in jury trial,
statutes, punitive damages and equitable restitution, frustrate
complete unification.
Stating the courts’ choice and measurement alternatives
proves to be a daunting task. In addition, this Article is generous
with advice about the routes lawyers and courts should take. This
Article adduces legal theory in an effort to clarify the better
choices. Plaintiffs’ lawyers have a wide range of possibilities. The
courts’ demanding duty is to align policies, remedies rules, and
solutions. The results turn out to be challenging at best, often
problematic. The risk of inaccuracy and over-correction is
pervasive. The search has not found a substitute for human
judgment. Principles of confinement, understanding of
alternatives, and careful contextual analysis will improve courts’
decision making.
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I. Introduction
This Article will examine civil courts’ money remedies to deal
with private commercial bribery through the lens of the following
hypothetical.
Sam Sailer “gives” Ben Beyer’s purchasing agent, Alice
Aggie, a sound system worth $8,000. Sailer’s “gratuity” facilitates
Aggie’s decision to buy Sailer’s speakers to sell in Beyer’s
NoisiStan Stores. Beyer learns about Aggie’s new speakers and
consults a lawyer.
My Remedies course in the spring of 2014 spent two class
sessions on commercial bribery. 1 The students began the course
thinking of Remedies law as having separate pigeonholes named
contract and tort, law and equity, damages and restitution;
overall, they were baffled during our commercial bribery
sessions. My experience with commercial bribery in the
classroom drew me to develop further the subject that David
Mills and Robert Weisberg refer to as “a fascinatingly underexplored area.” 2

1. See DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE ROBERTS, REMEDIES 857–63 (8th ed.
2011) (supplying the hypothetical for this article and providing a rough first
draft for it).
2. David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in
White-Collar Crime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1406 (2008).
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A. Gift or Bribe?

A bribe is a transfer that often takes the ostensible form of a
gift. In property law, the elements of a gift are the donor’s intent
to give plus a transfer to the donee; a gift does not require an
exchange of consideration. 3 But a bribe concealed as a gift
involves the parties’ surreptitious exchange of consideration
whereby the bribe recipient agrees to “earn” the transfer. 4
In this shadow world, we inquire whether Sailer and Aggie
created a corrupt bargain. Was Sailer’s transfer to Aggie a gift
that stemmed from his friendship and altruism? Or was it a bribe
based on his self-interest? Was there a quid pro quo, Aggie’s
promise or a wink and nod? Standing alone, the parties’
consideration may not be illegal on either side; but the addition
of the bribe element is an illegal performance. 5
Some employment-related transfers to agents are not
bribes. 6 A “gift” to an employee that her employer knows about—
a tip, for example—is not a bribe. 7 One rule of thumb is: “If you
can eat it and drink it in a single sitting, it’s not a bribe.” 8
In the grey area between a bribe and a gift, many “gifts” are
based less on the “donor’s” altruism than on his interest in
3. See WALTER B. RAUSCHENBUSH, BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY § 7.1 (3d
ed. 1975) (“A gift may be defined as a voluntary transfer of his property by one
to another without any consideration of compensation therefor.” (quoting Gray
v. Barton, 55 N.Y. 68, 72 (1873))).
4. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–
05 (1999) (“[F]or bribery there must be a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give
or receive something of value in exchange for an . . . act.”).
5. See GEORGE PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION §§ 8.5, 8.5 nn.6–7 (1978)
[hereinafter PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION] (describing one form of illegal
contract as where two parties agree to a transaction that, in and of itself, is
illegal (citing Oscanyon v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 267 (1880))).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 cmt. b, illus. 5 (AM. LAW INST.
1958).
7. See Jaclyn, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, 406 A.2d 474, 486, 491–92 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (stating that there is “no fraud perpetrated” where
the employer is aware of the bonus, gift, or commission and consummates an
agreement for business anyway).
8. Stephanie Francis Ward, Want to Be a Federal Judge by 35? 9th
Circuit’s Alexander Kozinski Shares Some Tips, A.B.A. J. (July 20, 2015, 12:11
PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/want_to_be_a_federal_judge_ by_
35_9th_circuits_alex_kozinski_shares_some_tip/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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obtaining the “donee’s” goodwill in one form or another. 9 On the
“donee’s” side, the human impulse to reciprocate may lead her to
return the favor. 10 A campaign contributor, for example, may
have a disinterested policy goal. Chief Justice Roberts wrote that
“spending large sums of money in connection with elections . . .
does not give rise to . . . quid pro quo corruption.” 11 In the grey
area, a contributor may achieve recognition or access that blends
into influence and reciprocity. Or the contributor may cross the
bribery line by conditioning his payment directly on the
politician’s specific vote on specific legislation. 12
“At what point do the ‘gifts’ become so clearly transactional,
however, that the behavior they induce is no longer viewed as
altruistic, but crass? That is the key question. The answer lies
both in the nature of the gift and the nature of the relationship
between the creator of the gift and its recipient.” 13 In tax law, for
example, an instrumental gift is income to the recipient, an
affectionate gift is subject to the donor’s gift tax. 14 “As the word is
most commonly used today, [criminal] ‘bribery’ probably denotes
an actual or contemplated exchange of something of value for
favorable governmental action, not simply a unilateral act
intended to make favorable governmental action more likely.” 15
Our hypothetical is not in the grey area. Aggie is the
purchasing agent for Beyer. Sailer gave her a “gratuity.” She
reciprocated. Suppose Beyer confronts Aggie with that “gift” and
with her later purchase of Sailer’s speakers for NoisaStan
inventory. She responds that Sailer is “just a dear friend.”
9. See generally Mary Finley Wolfenbarger, Motivations and Symbolism
in Gift-Giving Behavior, 17 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 699 (1990) (discussing
self-interest as an elemental part of gift-giving).
10. See id. 699–706 (discussing social norms in the context of gift-giving).
11. McCutchen v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014).
12. See JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBES 621, 651, 688–90 (1987) (covering the
topic of campaign contributions and bribery).
13. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE FUTURE OF LAW & ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN
REFORM AND RECOLLECTION 105 (2016).
14. See United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125, 1127 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding that sisters charged with tax evasion on money for sexual “favors”
provided by their lover which they had claimed as gifts were not guilty of willful
tax evasion).
15. Albert Alschuler, Criminal Corruption: Why Broad Definitions of
Bribery Make Things Worse, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 472 (2015).
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How might a court respond to a similar tale? An employee of
the United States Department of Agriculture accepted two
automobiles and a deep freeze as “gifts” from one De Angelis who
participated in programs the department administered. 16 Despite
the employee’s claims that Mr. De Angelis was just a friend and
“a kind and generous man,” the court entered judgment in favor
of the Government. 17 Explaining the difference between a bribe
and a perishable effort to “express friendship and assure a warm
welcome,” the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit observed that “if the jury agreed that a matured scheme
existed, aimed at providing millions of dollars in which Harwood
would share, no jury could rationally believe that this was merely
to cultivate friendship.” 18
B. Civil and Criminal Remedies
Civil remedies for commercial bribery function in the
penumbra of related areas of law. First, in criminal law, a private
commercial bribe may also be a crime. Criminal statutes in
thirty-nine states forbid commercial bribery; public-sector bribery
is criminal nationwide. 19 The United States has no general
16. See United States v. Drisko, 303 F. Supp. 858, 858–61 (E.D. Va. 1969)
(providing no satisfactory reason why Mr. DeAngelis gave Mr. Drisko those
“gifts”).
17. See id. at 860 (finding “that the deep freezer, the automobiles and the
money [the defendant] received from Mr. DeAngelis were secret profits and
gratuities”).
18. United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2006); see also United
States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 311–17 (1910) (reviewing the facts arising from
the illicit collection of contractors’ excess profits by a government official in the
amount of about $500,000).
19. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 641.3–641.4 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:21-10 (West 1986); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.00-08 (McKinney 1983); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.43 (West 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-444 (2016); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 224.8 (AM. LAW INST. 1962); Jeffery Boles, Examining the Lax
Treatment of Commercial Bribery in the United States: A Prescription for
Reform, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 119, 159 (2014) (“While all fifty states have
criminalized public sector bribery, such is not the case for commercial bribery.
Eleven states have yet to criminalize the offense of commercial bribery.”). The
most important and informative book about bribery is Judge John Noonan’s
wide-ranging Bribes (1987), which deals almost exclusively with criminal
treatment of bribery. See generally NOONAN, supra note 12.
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domestic federal criminal-bribery statute. 20 But it has specific
anti-bribery statutes, such as bribery of quiz show affiliates, for
example. 21
Bribery of a government official is serious. A civil
consequence of bribery with public-law consequences is that
Article II, Section 4 of the United States Constitution specifically
lists bribery as a ground for impeachment and removal from
office. 22 Criminal statutes that forbid and punish official bribery
are universal. 23 Bribery of a public official to facilitate a sale or a
contract, although more serious than private bribery, is relevant
to our subject. While this article was being written and in press,
a defense contractor’s protracted and brazen bribery of Pacific
Fleet officers including admirals was unraveling in guilty pleas. 24
Additionally, other criminal statutes come into play in the
context of bribery. For example, former Vice-President Agnew
was prosecuted for tax evasion on the kickbacks and bribes he
received. 25 Federal statutes related to bribery are the
20. See Boles, supra note 19, at 122 (“The U.S. Congress has not enacted a
blanket criminal statute that outlaws the practice, although a patchwork of
federal legislation has been used to prosecute commercial bribery.”); Susan
Rose-Ackerman, The Law and Economics of Bribery and Extortion, 6 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 217, 226 (2010) (“Some legal systems criminalize
private-to-private bribery, but in many jurisdictions such transactions are not
against the law unless they involve another illegal offense, such as extortion or
operation of an illegal business.”).
21. See 47 U.S.C. § 509(a)(2) (2012) (prohibiting the use of coercion or
bribery to influence a person to intentionally answer questions wrong or refrain
from answering on a quiz show).
22. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for,
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
23. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.8 (AM. LAW INST. 1962); 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(b) (2012) (making illegal any payment or gift to a public official in order to
corruptly influence that official to a specific official or otherwise illegal act).
24. See Craig Whitlock, Navy Repeatedly Dismissed Evidence that ‘Fat
Leonard’ was Cheating the 7th Fleet, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/navy-repeatedly-dismissedevidence-that-fat-leonard-was-cheating-the-7th-fleet/2016/12/27/0afb2738-c5ab11e6-85b5-76616a33048d_story.html?utm_term=.ddea1af112d8 (last visited
Mar. 6, 2017) (detailing the scope of the fraud) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
25. See JAMES PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES,
1945–1971, at 776 (1996) (detailing Vice President Agnew’s prosecution for tax
evasion).
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“honest-services” statute that courts have interpreted to cover
kickbacks and bribery, 26 the False Claims Act, 27 the
Whistleblower Protection Act, 28 the Federal Anti-Kickback Act, 29
wire fraud, 30 the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, (RICO), 31 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. 32
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which makes it a crime
for a United States company to bribe a government official in
another country, is mostly enforced by SEC and DOJ
settlements. 33 In late 2016, a generic drug maker settled criminal
26. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–09 (2010) (discussing
case law demonstrating bribes and kickbacks to be at the “core [of] honest
services fraud precedents” (citing United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069,
1077 (1st Cir. 1997))); see also McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355,
2368–69 (2016) (applying interpretive canon noscitur a sociis to find a narrow
definition of official act); United States v. Drisko, 303 F. Supp. 858, 860–61
(E.D. Va. 1969) (determining that the United States should be awarded
remedies where an employee of the Department of Agriculture received “gifts”
from businessmen in order to use his office to further the businessmen’s
interests); United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 362 (10th Cir. 1988)
(“[T]he authorities are unanimous that an officer or agent breaches his duty of
loyalty to his corporation or principal by accepting bribes to compromise his
principal’s interests.”); United States v. St. Pierre, 377 F. Supp. 1063, 1064–65
(S.D. Fla. 1974) (stating that criminal prosecution does not bar recovery of civil
remedies). See generally United States v. Rybicki, 287 F.3d 257 (2d Cir. 2002),
aff’d en banc, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (analyzing personal injury lawyers’
indirect kickbacks to insurance adjusters).
27. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3731 (2012) (laying out the False Claims Act as
well as procedure for civil remedies under the Act.).
28. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2012) (prohibiting any employer from taking
“personnel action,” measures against anyone who reports a suspected violation
of law or public health and safety, including termination).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012) (“[In federal health care programs]
whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind . . . shall be guilty of a felony.”).
30
See Andrea Gerlin, Deals on the Side: How a Penny Buyer Made Up to
$1.5 Million of Vendors’ Kickbacks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1995, at A1 (detailing
how vendors paid $1.5 million to a single buyer over four years).
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2012) (authorizing civil remedies for RICO
violations); see also Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Johnston, 763 F.3d 723, 728
(7th Cir. 2014) (discussing casino’s civil RICO action alleging that members of
horse-racing industry bribed governor).
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012) (addressing bribery of foreign government
officials by U.S. citizens).
33. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks—U.S.
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and civil charges for bribery of officials for $520 million. 34 A New
York Times story describes how Wal-Mart’s employees’ bribery in
Mexico affects the “culture” of the company, its governance, its
employees, and its stockholders. 35
Commentators have maintained that criminal statutes are
needed because the private common and statutory law is “clearly
inadequate.” 36 However, private commercial bribery is rarely
prosecuted as a crime. 37 Publicity-conscious companies sweep
bribery cases under the rug. 38 An unscientific survey uncovered
widespread ignorance of the criminal statutes.
Most enforcement of commercial bribery is civil. 39 A
plaintiff’s civil remedies for commercial bribery are, as we will
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: Some Observations
and Thoughts (Sept. 13, 2012), 2012 WL 4328247, at 3 (elaborating on the
Department of Justice’s preferred method of using deferred prosecution
agreements to settle with defendants in FCPA cases); see also John R. Cook,
U.S. Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission Guide to
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcements, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 227, 227 (2013)
(“The guide comes at a time of greatly increased FCPA enforcement, much
involving foreign companies, including nearly $3.2 billion in settlements . . . .”).
34. Charles Toutant, Teva Agrees to Pay $520M Over Bribes to Foreign
Officials, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.thelegal
intelligencer.com/id=1202775429882/Teva-Agrees-to-Pay-520M-Over-Bribes-toForeign-Officials (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (describing the settlement as the
largest criminal fine on a pharmaceutical company for FCPA violations) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
35. See Elizabeth A. Harris, After Bribery Scandal, High-Level Departures
at Walmart, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/business/afterwalmart-bribery-scandals-a-pattern-of-quiet-departures.html (last visited Mar.
6, 2017) (noting the company increased its compliance staff by 30% in two
years) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. Note, Commercial Bribery, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1928); see also
Boles, supra note 19, at 120–21, 158 (highlighting the “rampant” nature of
commercial bribery and the public benefits to statutory enforcement); Note,
Commercial Bribery: The Need for Legislation in Minnesota, 46 MINN. L. REV.
599, 603–04 (1962) (discussing the inadequacy of civil remedies).
37. See Boles, supra note 19, at 165 (“At present, federal and state
governments rarely prosecute commercial bribery, once called ‘the most underprosecuted crime in penal law.’” (quoting Bob Wacker, Inside a Case of
Commercial Bribery: How a Kickback Scheme in Hawaii Led to LI Sting,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 8, 1988, at 1)).
38. See Gerlin, supra note 30 (featuring Jim G. Locklear, the poster boy
bribe-taking purchasing agent).
39. See Note, Control of Nongovernmental Corruption by Criminal
Legislation, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 848, 853–55 (1960) (“The most salient feature of
the cases in this area is that they are very few in number and most of those
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see, formidable. 40 A student Note writer observed that the severe
civil remedies may deter people from reporting commercial
bribery to criminal authorities; but the Note continued by
stating, “it is questionable whether modification would encourage
disclosure.” 41 A business’s best defenses against bribery are its
internal controls and practices. 42
Generally speaking, criminal law is “public” law that the
government uses to punish the defendant’s misconduct. 43 Civil
law is “private” law for a private plaintiff to maintain and
vindicate his rights, and to receive a remedy. 44 The question of
whether the state should deal with a person’s misconduct as
either a crime or a civil matter is that “an offence should be
treated as a civil matter . . . if society wishes to trade off the
benefits to the perpetrator against the costs.” 45
One observation is that “tort law prices, while criminal law
punishes.” 46 In commercial bribery, that observation is
incomplete. Criminal and civil law are related as a Venn diagram
of overlapping circles. The civil court can wield punitive damages
to punish the defendant, but the civil defendant’s criminal
consequences may affect the amount of punitive damages. 47 If the
which are to be found are civil rather than criminal.”).
40. See Note, Commercial Bribery: The Need for Legislation in Minnesota,
supra note 36, at 603–04 (stating that civil remedies include losses suffered in
operating a business prior to the rescission of purchase, the cost of time lost by
the principal, expenses incurred, non-taxable litigation expenses, attorney fees,
the value of the amount actually bribed, and the ability to dismiss the agent).
41. Note, Bribery in Commercial Relations, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1251
(1932).
42. See Boles, supra note 19, at 168–72 (discussing the implementation of
proactive compliance measures in the private sector).
43. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Four Senses of the Public
Law-Private Law Distinction, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267 (1986).
44. See id. at 271 (including subjects that define “the enforceable duties
that all individuals owe to one another,” such as contract, torts, property, and
trusts and estates).
45. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 20, at 221 n.4.
46. John Coffee, Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193,
194 (1991).
47. See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361–62 (Me. 1985) (deciding to
affirm a judgment but vacate an award for punitive damages based on
otherwise criminal activity because the defendant’s recklessness did not amount
to malice).
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civil court grants the plaintiff an injunction, the defendant’s
subsequent breach may lead to criminal contempt. 48 Many types
of misconduct are both civil and criminal—for example,
assault-battery crimes against a person are also torts. 49 The civil
law defines property, thus leading to the crime of theft and the
tort of conversion. 50 As part of a criminal prosecution, the
prosecuting officials may secure compensation, mislabeled as
“restitution,” for the victim. 51 The bribee’s imprisonment may
prevent her from earning any income. Criminal fines and civilasset forfeitures may take the defendant’s assets. 52 Ray Nagin,
the former mayor of New Orleans, was convicted of taking bribes
from businessmen in exchange for city work; in addition to his
criminal sentence, the judge entered a forfeiture order for
$501,000. 53
What do the criminal commercial bribery statutes and rare
prosecutions imply for the civil commercial-bribery process? 54
The government’s criminal prosecution does not bar the private
48. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441–42 (1911)
(discussing the role of criminal contempt in vindicating the authority of the
court).
49. See Barnett, supra note 34, at 268 (discussing the philosophy behind
the tort/crime distinction).
50. See id. (explaining that theft “offends public standards of ‘good’
conduct” but is “wrongful in that it deprives a particular individual of
something that belonged to her”).
51. See United States v. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719–20 (2014) (using
“proximate cause” analysis in tort to limit an award of restitution in a criminal
case).
52. See generally Phillip Londen, Comment, Arizona's Civil Asset
Forfeiture Scheme: Distorted Justice, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 475 (2015) (providing
summary, analysis, and criticism of federal and state forfeiture); James Simon,
Note, Virginia's Civil Asset Forfeiture System: Valuable Tool or Vehicle for
Abuse?, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
53. See United States v. Nagin, 810 F.3d 348, 352–54 (5th Cir. 2016)
(upholding personal money judgment against defendant); see also Gabrielle
Levy, Ray Nagin, Former New Orleans Mayor, Must Pay Back $500K, UNITED
PRESS INT’L (May 28, 2014 4:17 PM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/
US/2014/05/28/Ray-Nagin-former-New-Orleans-mayor-must-pay-back-500K/925
1401306822/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (detailing Mayor Ragin’s payment order
for his involvement in over 20 counts of fraud) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
54
See generally Graham Virgo, We Do This in the Criminal Law and That
in the Law of Tort: A New Fusion Debate, in TORT LAW, CHALLENGING
ORTHODOXY (Stephen Pitel, Jason Neyres & Erica Chamberlin eds., 2013).
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plaintiff’s recovery of civil remedies. 55 However, using a threat to
prosecute another for a crime—for example, Sailer’s threat to
Aggie’s mother—to secure a civil advantage or settlement, is
improper duress. 56 The defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination—if the civil defendant claims it—may
impede the plaintiff’s civil discovery and trial testimony; because
of the defendant’s privilege, the court will usually stay the civil
process until the criminal process plays out. 57 Although delay is
usually the defendant’s friend, delay to wait out the criminal
process may benefit the civil plaintiff because the defendant’s
criminal conviction or guilty plea will establish issue preclusion
or estoppel in the civil case. 58 The burdens of proof differ. In
criminal law proceedings require culpability beyond a reasonable
doubt while civil proceedings only require a preponderance of the
evidence. Accordingly, a defendant may be acquitted of the crime,
but found liable to the civil plaintiff. 59
55. See United States v. St. Pierre, 377 F. Supp. 1063, 1064–65 (S.D. Fla.
1974) (“‘[A]lternate tax and criminal remedies . . . do not bar the [plaintiff] from
recovering the secret profits and gratuities thus received [in] civil action.’”
(quoting United States v. Drisko, 303 F. Supp. 858, 860 (E.D. Va. 1969))).
56. See Bank of Tucson v. Adrian, 245 F. Supp. 595, 598–99 (D. Minn.
1964) (treating the threat of jail for a third party as arising to the level of
duress entitling the threatened parties to recovery); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 14 illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST.
2011) (illustrating how threatening a third party with legal action constitutes
“impermissible coercion as a matter of law”).
57. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 97 (2d
Cir. 2012) (“A stay can protect a civil defendant from facing the difficult choice
between being prejudiced in the civil litigation, if the defendant asserts his or
her Fifth Amendment privilege, or from being prejudiced in the criminal
litigation if he or she waives that privilege in the civil litigation.”).
58. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (“Issue
preclusion . . . bars ‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually
litigated and resolved in a valid court’ . . . even if the issue recurs in the context
of a different claim.” (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748–49
(2001))). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 85 (AM. LAW INST.
1982).
59. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409
U.S. 232, 235 (1972) (“The acquittal of the criminal charges may have only
represented ‘an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.’ As to the issues raised, it does not
constitute an adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden
applicable in civil proceedings.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Ashley v.
Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 25 (HL) [para. 17–18] (appeal
taken from [2006] EWCA Civ 1085) (UK) (holding that different standards of
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This Article will next examine an employer’s civil remedies
against his bribed agent. Then it will move to his remedies
against the bribing seller. After discussing the employer’s
remedies against the bribee and the briber separately, the Article
will examine the defendants together.
II. Civil Remedies: The Employer Sues the Employee
The plaintiff’s private substantive theories largely stem from
the common law of agency, fiduciary duties, employment law,
contract, and tort, but they also include statutory responses. 60
Courts’ remedies include compensatory damages, legal and
equitable restitution, and punitive damages along with their
close relative, statutory multiplied damages. 61 The Article’s
technical doctrinal analysis will focus on courts’ decisions and the
policies of compensation, reversing unjust enrichment,
deterrence, and punishment. Coordinating the principal’s
smorgasbord of remedies to avoid excess and duplication is subtle
and difficult in light of the policy goals.
Courts in the United States rely on, and cite to, United
Kingdom decisions. 62 The law of commercial bribery in other
common law jurisdictions, although similar to the United States’,
differs in interesting ways depending not only on local statutes,
but also in the differing weight courts assign to policies interests
such as third-party interests, the importance of predictability,
the initial decision-maker’s discretion, and the need for rules
rather than standards. 63
proof apply in civil and criminal cases dealing with assault).
60. See Deborah A. DeMott, Relationships of Trust and Confidence in the
Workplace, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1263 (2015) (discussing fiduciary
relationship in the context of insider trading prohibition); see, e.g., United
States v. Manzo, 851 F. Supp. 2d 797, 806 (D.N.J. 2012) (assessing an allegation
of bribery by looking to the general definition of bribery, state law precedent,
the common law, and state statutes).
61. See infra notes 434–439 and accompanying text (describing the
difficulties in combining compensatory damages and restitution when the
plaintiff attempts to recover from both the giver and receiver of a bribe).
62. See United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 307–08 (1910) (referring to
English decisions and scholarship).
63. See generally MELVIN EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 26–
37 (1988); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
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“Bribery is an evil practice,” wrote the Privy Council, “which
threatens the foundations of any civilized society.” 64 Sailer’s bribe
raised the price or lowered the quality of goods to Aggie’s
employer Beyer, whose customers, in turn, pay too much. As a
result, rival sellers, Sailer, and the briber’s competitors, lose the
ability to compete. 65 The easiest part of our inquiry is the answer
that popular and judicial intuitions combine with market
economic theory to condemn a bribe as a wrong.
Human cussedness has not changed much. “[T]he principles
governing the paying or giving of bribes and secret commissions
to fiduciaries have been settled since at least the late 19th
century,” wrote Paul Finn, J., for the full Federal court in
Australia in Grimaldi v. Chameleon Mining. 66
Courts’ common law reasoning proceeds through policy
justification to rule, and through rule to result and remedy. 67 The
courts’ difficulties in aligning policy, rule, and result and their
fuzziness in characterization, choice, and measurement are
notable throughout this study. As a consequence, an untidy
result orientation may occur because courts and juries appear to
be avid in reversing commercial bribery and suppressing it in the
future. Working in the grey areas and fringes to identify excess
zeal is the difficult aspect of this inquiry.

EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 118–26
(1991).
64. Attorney General for H.K. v. Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC) 330 (appeal
taken from NZCA) (UK); see also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 20, at 218
(“[C]orruption is associated with lower levels of investment, productivity, and
growth and . . . discourages both capital inflows and foreign direct
investment . . . . Overall, corruption reduces the perceived legitimacy of
democratic governments.”). But see Mills & Weisberg, supra note 2, at 1412–15
(noting that bribery is not always anticompetitive).
65. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Commercial Bribery and the Sherman Act:
The Case for Per Se Illegality, 42 MIAMI L. REV. 365, 390–91 (1987) (showing the
anticompetitive effects of commercial bribery, including the raising of prices
generally).
66. N.L. [No 2] (2012) 200 FCR 296, 348 (Austl.). The law of bribery is
related enough to Judge Finn’s subject, the law of business self and doubledealing to qualify the latter as precedent for bribery. See generally Reid, 1 AC
324 (PC) at 330.
67. See generally EISENBERG, supra note 63, at 26–37; SCHAUER, supra note
63, at 118–26.
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A. Breach of Duty?
What branch of civil misconduct has Aggie committed?
Commercial bribery law is rooted in contract, tort,
employment-law, and agency-fiduciary principles. 68 In general,
an employer’s contract remedies—compensatory damages—are
more conservative than tort or agency-fiduciary remedies—often,
restitution. In addition to lower recovery, the defendant will
prefer a contract characterization because neither the plaintiff’s
recovery for breach of fiduciary duty nor his recovery for most
intentional torts will be discharged in her bankruptcy. 69
Scholarly ferment surrounds the fiduciary’s legal-theory and
doctrinal home. A leading private-law scholar, Professor Lionel
Smith, rejects a contract base for commercial bribery; the
solution to a fiduciary’s breach does not “derive from a breach of
a promissory obligation.” 70 Fiduciary law, Smith writes, has no
deterrent function; not instrumental, fiduciary law is based in
the normative structure. 71 For Smith, fiduciary duties are
“unified” and loyalty is a requirement, not a duty. 72 Courts’
solutions to fiduciary disputes are rules of primary attribution,
not secondary remedies rules. 73
On the other hand, Professor Adit Bagchi moves his analysis
of the related duty of loyalty from fiduciary status to contract. 74
68. See United States v. Manzo, 851 F. Supp. 2d 797, 806 (D.N.J. 2012)
(detailing the various sources and origins of the law of bribery).
69. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(4), (6) (2012) (recognizing that a discharge for
“fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity” or for “willful and
malicious injury by the debtor to another entity” will not occur).
70. Lionel Smith, Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of
Judgment on Behalf of Another, 130 L.Q. REV. 608, 613–14 (2014) [hereinafter
Smith, Fiduciary Relationships].
71. See id. at 626 (“I disagree with Lord Millett when he says that
fiduciary law has a deterrent function or is driven by public policy; in my view,
it reflects the normative structure of the fiduciary relationship.”).
72. See id. at 633 (“In private law, fiduciary relationships are characterised
by three elements: the requirement of loyalty, the no-conflict rules, and the
no-profit rule. They form a unified system for ensuring the loyal exercise of
judgement on behalf of another.”).
73. See id. at 628 (arguing that the right of the beneficiary to recover profit
is born of the fiduciary duty to render the profit, not from a secondary duty to
repay after being found liable for wrongdoing).
74. See Adit Bagchi, Exit, Choice and Employee Loyalty, in CONTRACT
STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 17–19 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds.,
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An employee’s duty of loyalty, he maintains, is contractual; it
implements the employee’s contractual duty of good faith; it is
not founded on the employee’s fiduciary status. 75
In general, the conditions for creation of a fiduciary duty are
satisfied when a principal delegates power to an agent; the agent
substituting for the principal exercises power to decide; and the
delegation and decisions create a risk of abuse and misconduct
that neither the principal nor the market can prevent. 76
Fiduciary duty is not “monolithic.” 77 “Fiduciary” is not a
unified concept, but it varies from one application to another. A
corporate officer is also an agent. An officer’s fiduciary duties are
more demanding than a director’s. An errant officer ought to
“face a greater risk of personal liability for misconduct.” 78
Suppose, for example, a mother’s will creates a special-needs
trust naming her intellectually disabled daughter as beneficiary
and her son as trustee. Contrast these relationships with our
problem of fiduciary law as a subset of agency law—for example,
a business owner and a purchasing agent where the owner can
monitor, direct, and discharge the agent.
Between the employer and employee, commercial bribery is
part of the familiar law-and-economics doctrine of agency cost. 79
An agent’s interest conflicts with her employer’s. 80 In a
principal-agent pair, the principal-employer is the boss who
forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2759401 (arguing that employers
wield too much power over employees without a formal contract).
75. See id. at 2 (“As a mandatory duty applied to the (generally) less
informed and less powerful party to contract, it should be narrowly construed
where job duties and terms of exist are unspecified in an employment contract
ex ante.”).
76. See Rash v. J.V. Intermediate, Ltd., 498 F.3d 1201, 1211 (10th Cir.
2007) (“The fiduciary duty exists because of the ‘peculiar’ trust between the
employee-agent and his employer-principal.” (citing Johnson v. Brewer &
Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. 2002))).
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
78. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers
Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1603 (2005).
79. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).
80. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 621, 637 (2004) [hereinafter Sitkoff, Agency Costs Theory]
(“The losses to the parties that stem from such a misalignment of interests are
called agency costs.”).
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delegates discretionary decision-making authority to his
subordinate, the agent-employee. 81 Tensions arise. The employer
cannot hire, train, and monitor employees to assure that his
interest will always be implemented, and he has limited ability to
control employees with rewards and penalties. 82 An employee
with specialized knowledge may maximize return and minimize
effort. 83 The conflicts of interest are inevitable, as anyone who
has been either an employer or an employee knows. 84 The gap
between the employer’s aspiration and the employee’s reality is
the agency cost. 85
When an agent accepts a bribe, she is no longer working
loyally on behalf of her principal’s interest, but rather she is
advancing the briber’s and her own self-interest. A commercial
bribe has a more serious agency cost than an employee’s
goldbricking or personal internet surfing to shop on the office
computer. 86 When discovered, it will usually trigger the
employee’s discharge, and it often catapults the parties into
court. 87 As a Minnesota court stated, “[f]idelity in the agent is
what is aimed at, and, as a means of securing it, the law will not
permit him to place himself in a position in which he may be
tempted by his own private interests to disregard those of his
principal.” 88
81. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976).
82. See id. at 308 (adding that “the agent will not always act in the best
interests of the principal”).
83. Id.
84. See id. (noting that it is “generally impossible” for the principal to
ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions, which maximize the
principal’s utility).
85. See generally Sitkoff, Agency Costs Theory, supra note 80 (highlighting
the agency cost emerging from the phenomenon of misaligned interests).
86. See Gevurtz, supra note 65, at 390–91 (showing the harsh effects, in
particular anticompetitive effects, of commercial bribery).
87. See Note, Commercial Bribery: The Need for Legislation in Minnesota,
supra note 36, at 603–04 (highlighting normal procedure in the course of civil
litigation for remedying commercial bribery).
88. Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 802–03 (Minn. 1952); see also
United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306 (1910) (discussing the importance of
establishing rules that prevent agents from hiding self-serving practices from
their principal); United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1961) (“The
law exacts a faithful single-minded devotion to the interests of the master.”);
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The Employment Restatement defines the employee’s duty of
loyalty, fiduciary duty, as one of “trust and confidence.” 89 An
employee with a fiduciary duty based on trust and confidence
may be liable for disgorgement and forfeiture. 90 In contrast, a
“rank and file” employee with only an implied fiduciary duty is
liable for more limited contract damages. 91
Even though lawyers and courts may consult the newly
minted Restatement of Employment Law, 92 the “national”
employment law is often neither structured nor uniform, a
situation that creates opportunities and choices for lawyers’
advocacy and courts’ characterization. Within employment law,
the law on employer remedies against an employee is
underdeveloped, because most former employees lack money to
pay a judgment and the employer is usually satisfied with
firing. 93
“[F]iduciary law is vague and open-ended around the
edges.” 94 In the grey areas, a court can select the desired
remedy, and then work backward to characterize the
appropriate substantive base. 95 As the Connecticut court
Jaclyn, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, 406 A.2d 474, 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1979) (“The evil of commercial bribery is the invasion of the principal's right to
undivided loyalty from his agent which results from secret payments to the
agent.”); Laseter v. Sistrunk, 168 So. 2d 652, 656 (Miss. 1964) (“[The agent] is
duty bound not to act adversely to the interest of his employer by serving or
acquiring any private interest of his own in antagonism or opposition thereto.”).
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
90. See id. § 9.09(d) (“If an employee personally profits from a breach of
fiduciary duty, the employer can recover those profits from the employee.”).
91. Id. § 9.09(a)–(c).
92. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW (AM. LAW INST.
2015).
93. See Charles Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 1391, 1401 n.58, 1410 n.109, 1419 n.162 (2015) (referencing instances
where employers were satisfied with termination, where employees were viewed
as judgment proof, or where employers were actually able to recover damages).
94. Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 261, 273 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds.,
2014).
95. See Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d 136, 139 (Conn. 1955) (discussing the
trend to stay away from outright definition of the term “fiduciary” in order to
leave “the bars down” to new situations); see also George P. Roach,
Compensation Forfeiture: Stacking Remedies Against Disloyal Agents and
Employees, 47 ST. MARY'S L.J. 249, 317–18 (noting disagreement on the precise
requirements of the duty of loyalty for rank-and-file workers).
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explained, “equity has carefully refrained from defining a
fiduciary relationship in precise detail and in such a manner as
to exclude new situations. It has left the bars down for
situations in which there is a justifiable trust confided on one
side and a resulting superiority and influence on the other.” 96 “A
fiduciary,” a lawyer quipped, “is what the judge calls your client
right before finding against him.”
Sailer has bribed Aggie to buy his speakers. As a
purchasing agent, Aggie enjoys her employer’s trust and
confidence. An agent like Aggie owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty
to her principal. A fiduciary must be other-regarding and favor
her principal’s interests above hers and others’. 97 Aggie has
breached either her freestanding fiduciary duty or an implied
fiduciary term of loyalty in her contract with her employer.
She also owes him a tort fiduciary duty of loyalty; 98 her
self-dealing breaches that duty. 99 Her secret profit breached two
duties: her contract and her fiduciary duty. 100 The
contract-fiduciary-tort distinction is our first area of choice or
characterization.

96. Id.
97. See generally Smith, Fiduciary Relationships, supra note 70.
98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)
(characterizing breach of fiduciary duty as a tort).
99. See supra notes 87–90 (providing for an employee’s duty of “trust and
confidence,” and providing damages for employee disloyalty, as well as damages
for disgorgement in the even the employee directly profits from the disloyalty);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY §§ 8.01 cmt. d, 8.02 cmt. e (2006) (dealing with
remedies for breach of fiduciary duty). See generally HOWARD A. SPECTER &
MATTHEW W. FINKIN, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION § 9.06
(1989). When the ALI’s members approved the proposed final draft of the third
Restatement of Employment Law at the May 2014 meeting, § 8.01's fiduciary
duty of loyalty was amended. The duty is only owed by an employee who
occupies a position of trust and confidence, but depending on the circumstances,
an employee may owe an implied duty of loyalty. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
100. See generally DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 699 (2d ed.
2011) [hereinafter DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS]. See also United States v.
Bowen, 290 F.2d 40, 44 (5th Cir. 1961) (criticizing the district court for viewing
the issue too narrowly by classifying it as merely a breach of contract); Jaclyn,
Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 406 A.2d 474, 491 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1979). (stating that New Jersey courts have treated such situations as both tort
actions and trust actions).
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The Restatements of Agency and Employment provide for an
injunction to forbid the briber from continuing his misconduct. 101
Although some employers may seek an injunction, Beyer—who
has fired Aggie—will not patronize Sailer again. He is not
interested in an injunction. We turn below to Beyer’s money
remedies.
The employer may choose between compensatory damages
and restitution. 102 This Article considers compensatory damages,
restitution, and punitive damages. Within compensatory
damages, the employer may choose between contract and tort. 103
A contract plaintiff may usually not recover punitive damages,
unless the breach includes an independent tort. 104 The employer’s
tort damages will usually be larger because recoveries for
emotional distress are available for a tort, 105 and, if the
defendant’s misconduct surmounts the jurisdiction’s threshold, a
tort plaintiff may recover punitive damages. 106
Restitution takes two forms, legal and equitable. 107
Restitution may be augmented with punitive damages. 108
101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.08(b) (AM. LAW INST.
2015) (providing for an injunction); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d
(AM. LAW INST. 2006) (same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 cmt. d
(AM. LAW INST. 1958) (same). If Aggie violates a noncompetition covenant, Beyer
may seek an injunction prohibiting future violations. See Presto-X-Company v.
Ewing, 442 N.W.2d 85, 89–91 (Iowa 1989) (remanding on grounds that the
lower court should have issued an injunction where a non-compete agreement
was involved); Robert S. Weiss & Assocs. v. Weiderlight, 546 A.2d 216, 226
(Conn. 1988).
102. See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91
B.U. L. REV. 1039, 1048 (2011) (contrasting compensatory damages with
disgorgement).
103. See Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (Cal. 1996)
(“Recovery . . . may be limited by the rule against double recovery of tort and
contract compensatory damages.” (citing Tavaglione v. Billings, 4 Cal. 4th 1150,
1159 (Cal. 1993))).
104. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 381 A.2d 16, 22 (Md. 1977) (“[T]he
rule has developed that punitive damages may never be recovered in pure
breach of contract suits . . . .”).
105. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 100, § 382.
106. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 25 (2001) (describing a case
where the appellee sought punitive damages for “embarrassment, humiliation,
and emotional distress”).
107. See generally RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 491–92.
108. See Ward v. Taggert, 336 P.2d 534, 538 (Cal. 1959) (“Courts award
exemplary damages to discourage oppression, fraud, or malice by punishing the
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Equitable restitution, in turn, takes two forms, constructive
trust 109 and accounting. 110 We will observe a shifting focus on
compensation, reversing unjust enrichment, deterrence, and
punishment below as courts examine the employer’s money
remedies that flow from commercial bribery. 111
We will inquire whether the employer’s remedies are well
adjusted to the employee’s blameworthiness or are potentially too
harsh, too draconian.
B. Salary Forfeiture
For an employer’s remedies, we begin with salary forfeiture.
The court may order a bribed employee to forfeit her
compensation, subject to statutes on wage payment and to
wrongdoer. Such damages are appropriate in cases . . . where restitution would
have little or no deterrent effect, for wrongdoers would run no risk of liability to
their victims beyond that of returning what they wrongfully obtained.” (internal
citation omitted)). The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment states:
[B]ecause disgorgement, at least in theory, imposes no net loss on the
defendant, there are situations in which a court may conclude that
the threat of liability to disgorge profits will not adequately deter the
misconduct . . . . A court that reaches this conclusion will sometimes
supplement the defendant’s liability in restitution with an award of
exemplary damages.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. k (AM.
LAW INST. 2011).
109. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
110. See id. § 51 cmt. a (“Restitution measured by the defendant’s wrongful
gain is frequently called ‘disgorgement.’ Other cases refer to an ‘accounting’ or
an ‘accounting for profits.’”).
111. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. e, reporter’s note e
(AM. LAW INST. 2006) (articulating the available remedies “to a principal when
an agent receives a secret commission from a third party,” “a third party’s
liability to the principal,” and “when a defendant is a director or senior
executive of a corporation”); ANDREW BURROWS, REMEDIES FOR TORTS AND
BREACH OF CONTRACT 615–21 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter BURROWS, REMEDIES]
(discussing remedies for bribes and secret commissions); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 10.6 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES] (discussing liabilities for a bribing seller’s liability to
the buyer and to competitors for commercial bribery and associated harms). See
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43
cmt. d, illus. 17–18; id. § 44 cmt. b, illus. 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
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feasible apportionment. 112 “Mr. Kelly’s claims,” a court wrote, “for
back salary and expense reimbursement are dismissed as not
recoverable because of his disloyalty to his employer during the
period for which he is making those claims.” 113 The bribe negates
an element of an agent’s contract cause of action for wages, and it
serves as the employer’s affirmative defense. 114 Forfeiture may
also be an employer’s freestanding equitable restitution remedy
interposed either as a claim or a counterclaim. 115 Forfeiture may
comprise the largest portion of the employer’s remedy. 116
112. See Kaye v. Rosefielde, 121 A.3d 862, 874–75 (N.J. 2015) (ordering
former executive to disgorge salary during periods of disloyalty even though
employer had no compensatory damages). See generally PALMER, THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 14.9; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW
§ 9.09 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d(2) (AM.
LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent's breach of fiduciary duty is a basis on which the
agent may be required to forfeit commissions and other compensation. The
availability of forfeiture is not limited to its use as a defense to an agent's claim
for compensation.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 456 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 1958) (“If an agent is paid a salary apportioned to periods of time, or
compensation apportioned to the completion of specified items of work, he is
entitled to receive the stipulated compensation for periods or items properly
completed before his renunciation or discharge.”); id. § 469 cmt. d (“The fact
that [an agent] has been disloyal or insubordinate in one transaction does not
disentitle him to indemnity on account of other transactions.”); Commercial
Bribery, supra note 36, at 800 (“The breach of duty would privilege the principal
in discharging the agent, without incurring any liability for the compensation
that he had agreed to pay . . . .” (citing Dennison v. Aldirch, 114 Mo. App. 700
(1905))); Commercial Bribery: The Need for Legislation in Minnesota, supra note
36, at 603–04 (“[T]he principal may dismiss the disloyal agent without incurring
any liability for breach of an employment contract . . . . However, the agent’s
disloyalty does not allow the principal to withhold compensation for prior or
subsequent faithful service unless such payment includes some compensation
for willfully disloyal service.”). See generally Control of Nongovernmental
Corruption by Criminal Legislation, supra note 39, at 855.
113. MDO Dev. Corp. v. Kelly, 726 F. Supp. 79, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also
Dorsett Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Whitt Tile & Marble Distrib. Co., 734 S.W.2d 322,
323–26 (Tenn. 1987).
114. See Control of Nongovernmental Corruption by Criminal Legislation,
supra note 39, at 855 (“Another frequent situation finds the agent or employee
suing the seller on their contract to recover the compensation promised for his
services. Such a contract is of course not recognized if the seller can prove that
it was in violation of the criminal statutes.” (citing Stone v. Freeman, 298 N.Y.
268, 271 (1948))).
115. See generally Kaye v. Rosefielde, 121 A.3d 862, 872 (N.J. 2015). For
more detailed discussion of forfeiture, see Roach, supra note 95, at 305–07, 311.
116. See Roach, supra note 95 at 292, app. (comparing recoveries in ten
cases).
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If Beyer sues her, Aggie’s counterclaim to recover her back
salary may fail. Indeed Beyer may recover her salary from the
disloyal period. The reason for saying “may” twice in the
preceding sentences is that the Employment Restatement,
without resolving the issue definitively, seems to present the
defendant’s wage forfeiture as an alternative to the plaintiff’s
compensatory damages: first, it hints that forfeiture may
constitute “double recovery”—that is, apparently duplicating
damages 117—and, second, that forfeiture will occur when the
employer lacks a “practicable method for making a reasonable
calculation of the harm”—that is, when damages cannot be
calculated. 118
The Employment Restatement’s comments articulate several
ways to calculate the amount the agent forfeits based on time,
task, willfulness, and the employer’s damages. 119 Its comments
retreat from stern moralistic “forfeiture for disloyalty” positions
and apparently adopt a flexible multi-factor approach. 120
Although the Employment Restatement does not focus on
commercial bribery, we commend a commercial-bribery court to
adopt its flexible, multi-factor approach to calculate Aggie’s wage
forfeiture.
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(c) (AM. LAW INST.
2015) (stating that an employer can deny compensation owed and obtain the
return of any compensation paid except where the employer would obtain from
double recovery).
118.
[A]n employer may deny any compensation owed, and obtain the
return of any compensation paid, to an employee who breaches the
employee’s duty of loyalty owed the employer where . . . the nature of
the employee’s dishonesty is such that there is no practicable method
for making a reasonable calculation of the harm caused the employer
by the employee’s disloyal services.
Id.
119. See id. cmt. c (describing the possible ways to determine the amount an
employee forfeits based on the extent to which an employee’s compensation can
be allocated to time periods or tasks, willful breach of the duty of loyalty, and
harm caused by the employee’s breach); see also Roach, supra note 95, at 332–
38.
120. See id. (“This Section adopts a position similar to those jurisdictions
that have rejected a flat-out ‘forfeiture for disloyalty’ approach. [Instead], the
employer can deny compensation to the disloyal employee to the extent the
economic harm caused by the employee’s disloyal services exceeds any benefit
provided by the employee.”).
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Professor Charles Sullivan would circumscribe the
employer’s forfeiture remedy even more. 121 He would limit it to
higher-level employees because board control is either weak or
absent. 122 He would narrow it there to include only the
employee’s subjective willful misconduct. 123 Lower-level
employees do not owe their employers a duty of loyalty for
fiduciary status and a forfeiture remedy, but they are liable for
contract damages only. 124 He would eliminate wage forfeiture for
an employee’s theft, limiting the employer to tort and criminal
remedies. 125 He took no position on kickbacks. 126
C. Compensatory Damages
The policy basis of compensatory damages begins with
compensation, to put the plaintiff where he would have been
economically without the defendant’s breach. 127 Another policy
justification for damages is deterrence, to reduce the incentive
to cause harm, 128 the harm here being to receive or give a
bribe. 129 The Employment Restatement allows the employer to
recover money damages for “past and reasonably certain future
121. See generally Charles Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant:
Reconciling Employment Law, Contract Law and Fiduciary Duty, 2011 WIS. L.
REV. 777, 814–18 (2011).
122. Id. at 819–22 (“Although in theory even higher-level employees are
subject to the control of the employer, typically a corporation's board of
directors, in practice the exercise of such control is likely to be weak or even
nonexistent, a reality that has generated numerous proposals for reform of
corporate governance.”).
123. Id. at 822–26 (arguing that narrowing the remedy to willful misconduct
“would at least provide courts with an escape hatch from forfeiture where the
breach was not egregious, and . . . such an escape hatch would be used more
frequently when the employer suffered no harm”).
124. Id. at 819.
125. Id. at 817.
126. See generally id. at 817–25.
127. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 1.1 (“The damages
remedy is a money remedy aimed at making good the plaintiff’s losses.”).
128. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 100, § 14.
129. See generally Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining N. L. (No 2) [2012] 200
FCR 296, 349, 421 (Austl.); PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION 339 (1989) [hereinafter BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION].
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economic loss and noneconomic loss.” 130 Aggie’s employer may
also recover special damages. 131 For example, he may recover
proved lost business profits. 132 The Employment Restatement
doesn’t develop the employer’s damages remedy but refers the
reader back to its earlier section on the employee’s damages
when the employer breaches. 133 More specific statements of the
employer’s compensatory damages comprise pecuniary damages
for his lost business profit and good will as well as nonpecuniary
damages for his emotional distress.
The Minnesota court’s decision in Tarnowski v. Resop 134
illustrates an employer’s compensatory damages for a
commercial bribery. The parties entered into a fiduciary
relationship in which the agent agreed to inspect coin-operated
music machines on behalf of the principal, who wished to
purchase the machines if they met certain specifications. 135 The
agent not only lied about the location and profitability of the
machines, but he also accepted bribes from the machine seller. 136
Even though the principal rescinded his contract with the seller,
the court found the agent liable for the amount of the bribe plus
all damages that could reasonably be foreseen because of his
tortious breach of fiduciary duty. 137 Compensation for injury to
the principal’s business and attorney’s fees were among the
principal’s foreseeable damages. 138

130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(b) (AM. LAW INST.
2015).
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
132. See Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 1952) (allowing for
recovery of lost profits); Dorsett Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Whitt Tile & Marble
Distrib. Co., 734 S.W.2d 322, 323–26 (Tenn. 1987) (same); Banks v. Mario
Indus. of Va., Inc., 650 S.E.2d 687, 696 (Va. 2007) (same); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (same).
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
2015).
134. 51 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1952).
135. Id. at 802.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 803–05.
138. Id. at 803.
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Her employer may recover the bribe from the bribed
employee. 139 We will turn below to the ambiguity about whether
recovery of the bribe is restitution or compensatory damages.
D. Restitution
Restitution’s policy base is twofold: to reverse or prevent the
defendant’s unjust enrichment and to deter the defendant and
others from engaging in similar misconduct. 140 Recovery of
damages to compensate the plaintiff for loss is not involved in
restitution.
In general, a faithless fiduciary must disgorge her unjust
gains. 141 A court will speak in the language of fiduciary
responsibility: a fiduciary who breaches a trust relationship and
benefits as a result may not retain the benefit. Aggie’s return of
any compensation she received during her disloyal period 142 is
139. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 43(1) illus. 17, 18 (AM. LAW INST. 2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006). See also United States v. Killough,
848 F.2d 1523, 1532 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that an employer may recover a
bribe); United States v. King, 469 F. Supp. 167, 171 (D.S.C. 1979) (same);
Tarnowski, 51 N.W.2d at 803 (same); Risvold v. Gustafson, 296 N.W. 411, 413
(Minn. 1941) (same); Jaclyn, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 406 A.2d 474, 492
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (same); Commercial Bribery, supra note 36, at
800 (discussing bribery of agents under the common law); Commercial Bribery:
The Need for Legislation in Minnesota, supra note 36, at 603 (noting an
employer may recover his actual damages, excluding the bribe, only once);
Control of Nongovernmental Corruption by Criminal Legislation, supra note 39,
at 855–56 (detailing who is entitled to the bribe money, against whom, and
under what circumstances).
140. See generally Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining N.L. (No 2) [2012] 200
FCR 296, 349, 421 (Austl.); BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 129, at 339.
141. See generally United States v. Project on Gov’t Oversight, 572 F. Supp.
2d 73, 76–77 (D.D.C. 2008); Daniel v. Falcon Interest Realty Corp., 190 S.W.3d
177, 186–87 (Tex. App. 2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
§ 9.09(d) (AM. LAW INST. 2015); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2011); SPECTER & FINKIN, supra
note 99, § 9.08; PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, §§ 2.11, 8.5.
142. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(c) (AM. LAW INST.
2015) (allowing employer’s to “recover any compensation paid” as a result of the
breach of “the employee’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to the employer”); United
States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306 (1910) (arguing that “justice will not
tolerate, under any circumstances, that a[n] [agent] shall retain any profit or
advantage which he may realize through the acquirement of an interest in
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restitution. 143 The agent’s employer may recover his employee’s
personal profits from her breach of her fiduciary duty of
loyalty. 144
Restitution is divided into two categories, giving-back
restitution and giving-up restitution. 145 In giving-back
restitution, the plaintiff’s minus is the defendant’s plus—for
example, an incorrect bank deposit where the depositor’s gain is
the bank’s loss. 146 The employer’s recapture of an embezzler’s
bezzle or a breaching employee’s compensation—forfeiture—is
giving-back restitution that is not otherwise involved in remedies
for commercial bribery. 147
In giving-up restitution—the focus here—the plaintiff has no
minus or cannot prove one, and the defendant’s benefit is from
elsewhere. Giving-up restitution is usually based on defendant’s
tort or other wrong. 148 Giving-up restitution can be either the
legal restitution common count of money had and received 149 or
equitable restitution in the form of either a constructive trust or
an accounting. 150 The pattern in restitution for commercial
bribery is giving-up restitution; the bribe moved from the briber
to the agent. This leaves the agent with a plus without any
minus subtracted from the principal.
conflict with his fidelity as an agent”); United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40, 44
(5th Cir. 1961) (noting that a master “is entitled to all the fruits of the servant’s
dereliction” (citations omitted)); Laseter v. Sistrunk, 168 So. 2d 652, 656 (Miss.
1964) (“[A]n agent . . . cannot, without the latter's consent, retain profits or
earnings received in the course of performance of the employer's business or in
an undertaking which constitutes a breach of duty to the employer.”).
143. See PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 8.5 n.9 (citing
cases in support).
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(d) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
145. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 1(e)(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“A liability in unjust enrichment (restitution) is
enforced by restitution's characteristic remedies, some (but not all) of which
involve a literal restitution or giving back.”).
146. See id. § 1(e)(1) (“Restitution restores something to someone, or
restores someone to a previous position.”).
147. See id. (“[Restitution] may do the former by restoring the very property
that the claimant gave up, or by granting substitute property rights.”).
148. See generally id. §§ 3, 39, 40–49, 51, 55.
149. See generally United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 317 (1910).
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 51,
55 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
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Although the Restatement of Restitution’s basic section one
says that the defendant’s enrichment must be “at the expense of”
the plaintiff, the comment explains that
[W]hile the paradigm case of unjust enrichment is one in
which the benefit on one side of the transaction corresponds to
an observable loss on the other, the consecrated formula “at
the expense of another” can also mean “in violation of the
other’s legally protected rights,” without the need to show that
the claimant has suffered a loss. 151

Restitution is based on the defendant’s gain, not on plaintiff’s
loss. A restitution plaintiff may recover the defendant’s gain even
though that gain exceeds the plaintiff’s loss measured by
compensatory damages. 152 Compensation drops out because the
restitution plaintiff may lack any pecuniary loss for
compensatory damages. 153 The commercial bribery plaintiff may
recover the bribe as restitution, even if he has neither pecuniary
loss nor compensatory damages. 154 The policies advanced by the
buyer’s restitution are preventing the defendants’ unjust
enrichment
and
deterrence
restitution
policies,
not
compensatory-damages policies. 155
151. Id. § 1 cmt. a; see also Caroline Needham, Recovering the Profits of
Bribery, 95 L.Q. REV. 536, 537–38 (1979).
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (discussing circumstances where recovery may
exceed compensatory damages).
153. Id.
154. See United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 307 (1910) (allowing
employer to recover employee’s illicit gains); United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d
40, 44–45 (5th Cir. 1961) (reversing summary judgment on the grounds that
evidence of an employee acting in his own self-interest at the expense of his
employer provided sufficient facts upon which to state a claim of relief); Cty. of
Cook v. Barrett, 344 N.E.2d 540, 546 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (“[W]hen a fiduciary,
who has acted for his beneficiary or principal, receives a gift, or bonus or
commission from a party with whom he has transacted business, that benefit
may be recovered from him by the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship.”);
Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 802–03 (Minn. 1952) (“If an agent has
received a benefit as a result of violating his duty of loyalty, the principal is
entitled to recover from him what he has so received, its value, or its proceeds,
and also the amount of damage thereby caused . . . .” (internal citations
omitted)). See generally PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.11.
155. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT §§ 43 illus. 17–19, reporter’s note; 44 illus. 9, reporter’s note b (AM.
LAW INST. 2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
2006).
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In United States v. Carter, 156 for example, a captain of the
United States army with discretion to hire contractors fell into a
bribery scheme with river and harbor contractors. 157 The work
was completed satisfactorily. 158 Although the United States was
unable to prove specific pecuniary injury or harm from his
bribery scheme, it sought an accounting of all of Carter’s illicit
profits. 159 The Court found that “[i]t would be a dangerous
precedent to lay down as law that unless some affirmative fraud
or loss can be shown, the agent may hold on to any secret benefit
he may be able to make out of his agency.” 160 The Court noted
that agents are capable of hiding their deception and “[i]t [is] not
easy to show in some instances that the work ha[s] suffered by
the substitution of one material for another,” making it difficult
for the employer to prove specific harm. 161 As such, “[i]t is
immaterial if that appears whether the complainant was able to
show any specific abuse of discretion, or whether it was able to
show that it had suffered any actual loss by fraud or
otherwise.” 162 The Court did not base the principal’s recovery on
a finding of its specific harm, but rather on the agent’s abuse of
trust that warranted an accounting of his illicit gains. 163
In addition to the agent’s breaches of fiduciary and
confidential relationships that we are examining, 164 a restitution
plaintiff either without compensatory damages or with
compensatory damages that are less than the defendant’s gain
may recover the defendant’s gain. 165 There are several wellknown examples of this brand of restitution in torts: trespass, 166
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

217 U.S. 286 (1910).
Id. at 297–98.
Id. at 298–300.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 305–06.
Id. at 303–04.
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 43 illus. 14, 15 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
165. See generally id. § 55, cmts. a, i; BURROWS, REMEDIES, supra note 111,
at 616; PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.11.
166. See Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1028–29 (Ky. 1936)
(discussing a case where two adjoining landowners’ properties sat over a cave,
and one landowner profited from charging visitors and the other sued to collect
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overuse of an easement, 167 and conversion. 168 Statutes allow
restitution that exceeds plaintiff’s damages for a trademark
infringer on non-competing goods or services, 169 a copyright
infringer, 170 and a trade-secrets infringer. 171 In equity, a plaintiff
may recover restitution that exceeds damages when, for example,
the trustee of an express trust “borrows” trust money and profits
from a forbidden investment, 172 a trustee buys at the auction, 173
or a business fiduciary improperly takes advantage of a business
opportunity. 174 A final example of a plaintiff’s restitution
the profits reaped from trespass into his portion of the cave). See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40 (AM. LAW
INST. 2011).
167. See Raven Red Ash v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231, 238 (Va. 1946) (“To limit
plaintiff to the recovery of nominal damages for the repeated trespasses will
enable defendant, as a trespasser, to obtain a more favorable position than a
party contracting for the same right. Natural justice plainly requires the law to
imply a promise to pay a fair value of the benefits received.”). See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40 illus. 8
(AM. LAW INST. 2011).
168. See Olwell v. Nye & Nisson, 173 P.2d 652, 654 (Wash. 1946)
(measuring defendant’s gain from use of egg washing machine rather than
plaintiff’s loss for damages). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40 illus. 17 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
169. See Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117,
123–25 (9th Cir. 1968) (finding it appropriate to make trademark infringement
“unprofitable,” via an accounting of profits, to deter future infringement). See
generally 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012).
170. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012); Three Boys Music Corp. v.
Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 487 (9th Cir. 2000); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 402 (1940); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 illus. 7–9 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
171. See generally UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1985); RESTATEMENT OF (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 1995).
172. See Slay v. Burnett Tr., 187 S.W.2d 377, 389–90 (Tex. 1945) (finding
payments collected by trustees recoverable).
173. See Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1921) (“Since he did pursue it
and profits resulted the law made him accountable to the trust estate for all the
profits obtained by him and those who were associated with him in the matter,
although the estate may not have been injured thereby.”); Smith v. Credico
Indus. Loan Co., 362 S.E.2d 735, 737 (Va. 1987) (“[W]e hold that a co-trustee
under a deed of trust cannot purchase property on behalf of herself or another
at a foreclosure sale, even where that sale is conducted by another trustee, and
even where the trustee who makes the purchase was not an active participant
in conducting the sale.”).
174. See generally Sanford v. Keech (1726) 25 Eng. Rep. 223; RESTATEMENT
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recovery that exceeds compensatory damages is insider
trading. 175
The court may describe Beyer’s recovery of the amount of
the bribe as restitution. If she keeps the speakers, Aggie will be
benefitted or enriched. Her benefit from her breach of duty is an
unjust one, for she secured it through a breach of contract and a
tort. Restitution for her wrong seems straightforward. 176
Suppose that Aggie’s bribe caused no detriment to her
principal because she purchased speakers that Beyer wanted
from Sailer at a competitive price. Nevertheless, when an
agent-employee accepts a bribe, she deprives her principal of
her disinterested advice. Her conflict of interest and her breach
of her duty of loyalty are obvious. 177 Since the agent should not

(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 illus. 14, 15 (AM. LAW
INST. 2011).
175. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969) (“It is well
established . . . that a person who acquires special knowledge or information by
virtue of a confidential or fiduciary relationship with another is not free to
exploit that knowledge or information for his own personal benefit but must
account to his principal for any profits derived therefrom.”). See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 illus. 9
(AM. LAW INST. 2011).
176. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 43 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
177. See Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 802 (Minn. 1952) (“It matters
not that the principal has suffered no damage or even that the transaction has
been profitable to him”); Jaclyn, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 406 A.2d 474,
492 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (“An agent is presumed to be acting with
absolute devotion to his principal at all times.”); City of New York v. Liberman,
660 N.Y.S.2d 872, 876 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (“It is a matter of grave public
concern that there be absolute honesty in the procuring of a public contract.”
(internal quotations omitted)). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT
LAW § 9.09 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY §§ 8.01 cmt. d, 8.02 cmt. e, illus. 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); SPECTER &
FINKIN, supra note 99, § 9.08; United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 305–06
(1910); United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40, 44 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v.
King, 469 F. Supp. 167, 171 (D.S.C. 1979).
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retain the tainted benefit, no one else has a valid claim for it. 178
Beyer may recover the bribe, which is more than he lost. 179
Describing the bribe as unjust enrichment, Beyer may
recover restitution from Aggie. Beyer’s recovery of $8,000, the
amount of her unjust gain, from disloyal-employee Aggie seems
relatively straightforward. 180
E. Damages and Legal Restitution
A court may also characterize Beyer’s recovery of Aggie’s
bribe as compensatory damages. The agent may have altered the
course of the bribe money as follows: Aggie diverted a “benefit,”
the bribe, that might have otherwise gone to Beyer. Sailer’s bribe
represents what might have become Sailer’s discount or reduced
price to Beyer. 181 The court may state the employer’s recovery of
the bribe as compensatory damages because his payment to the
seller included “an overpayment in the amount of the
commission.” 182
In a complex English dispute about whether an
owner-principal could recover bribes that contractors had paid to
the owner’s agent, the chancellor wrote that “the price [the owner
paid the contractors] was actually increased by the amount of the
178. See generally PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.11.
For more examples see United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 307 (1910); United
States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40, 44–45 (5th Cir. 1961); Tarnowski v. Resop, 51
N.W.2d 801, 802–03 (Minn. 1952); Cty of Cook v. Barrett, 344 N.E.2d 540, 544
(Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
179. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (noting that excess recovery is
possible when “[i]n a two-party restitution contest . . . if the defendant is a
conscious wrongdoer or a defaulting fiduciary”); Smith, Fiduciary Relationships,
supra note 59, at 628–31, n.83, n.91.
180. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, §10.6 n.2 (“The employer
is thus entitled to recover the amount of the bribe from the employee.”). We set
aside the question of whether the court should measure the employer’s recovery
by wholesale rather than retail.
181. Borough of Salford v. Lever, [1891] 1 Q.B. 168 (C.A. 1890).
182. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.11 n.22; see also
Needham, supra note 151, at 538–39 (discussing the presumption that the real
price of a good includes the bribe). See generally City of New York v. Liberman,
660 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Reading v. Attorney Gen., [1951]
A.C. 507 (HL) (Eng.).
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bribe” that the contractors had paid to the faithless agent. 183
“The purchase money is loaded by the amount of the bribe.” 184
In City of New York v. Liberman, 185 the City recovered the
amount of the bribe even though the agent had returned it. The
court articulated the result as “presumed” compensatory
damages: it “presumed” injury because the bribe was included in
the price. 186 By another way of articulating damages as the
result, “institutional” harm resulted even though the employer
had no pecuniary loss. 187
Using the bribe to measure the employer’s damages is
imprecise. A maximizing briber would expect to make more than
the amount of the bribe:
Where bribes are accepted by a trustee, servant, agent or
other fiduciary, loss and damage are caused to the
beneficiaries, master or principal whose interests have been
betrayed. The amount of loss or damages resulting from the
acceptance of a bribe may or may not be quantifiable. In the
present case the amount of harm caused to the administration
of justice in Hong Kong by the [corrupt prosecuting attorney]
in return for bribes cannot be quantified. 188

A court may dispense with the amount of the bribe to
measure damages and adopt an even more spacious
measurement rule. One court distinguished between kickback
and bribery schemes, and said that the damages measurement
calculations are not necessarily identical. In United States v.
Killough, 189 two Alabama state officials who were in charge of
administering a housing program received kickbacks from

183. Daraydan Holdings Ltd. v. Solland Int’l Ltd., [2004] EWHC (Ch.) 662,
[para. 87].
184. Donemar v. Molloy, 169 N.E. 610, 611 (N.Y. 1930).
185. 660 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
186. Id. at 43–48.
187. See I.M. Jackman, Restitution for Wrongs, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 302, 312–
14 (1989) (“The rationale for disgorging the fiduciary’s benefit might then not lie
in protecting the beneficiaries from personal loss, but in preserving the integrity
of the fiduciary relationship.”).
188. Attorney Gen. for H.K. v. Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC) 330 (appeal taken
from NZCA) (UK). See generally Mills & Weisberg, supra note 2, at 1376, 1406;
Bribery in Commercial Relations, supra note 41.
189. 848 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1988).
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contractors in exchange for granting them contracts. 190 The
contractors inflated their prices to cover the amount of the
kickback. 191 The United States sued under the False Claims Act
and moved for summary judgment for the amount of the
kickbacks. 192 The defendants argued that the government had
“no actual damages” because none of the losing contractors’ bids
were lower than theirs. 193 The Court of Appeals responded with a
spacious theory of injury and measurement: “When an official
acting on behalf of the government receives money to which he is
not entitled for the purpose of inducing that official to act in a
certain manner, the government has been damaged to the extent
that such corruption causes a diminution of the public’s
confidence in the government, as well as by any excess money it
paid and the administration costs of prosecuting the case.” 194
The Court of Appeals rejected the amount the contractors
paid the officials as the measure of damages. 195 The court said
that kickbacks and bribes are two different legal violations; it
stated that “[a]lthough a bribe and a kickback are both corrupt
payments to a party to induce a desired reaction, they cannot be
treated interchangeably for the method of computing
damages.” 196 The presumption of recovering the amount of a
bribe did not apply to a kickback scheme. Instead, the court
found that “[c]ase law indicates the measure of damages is
generally determined to be the difference between what the
government actually paid on the fraudulent claim and what it
would have paid had there been fair, open and competitive
bidding.” 197 The amount of the bribes, although neither a floor
nor a conclusive measure, was “circumstantial evidence.” 198
The amount of the bribe is more of a default rule than a
measure of pecuniary damages. 199 “Many damages recoveries,”
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 1526.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1532.
Id. at 1528.
Id. at 1532.
Id.
Id.
See John P. Woods, Civil Forfeiture as a Remedy for Corruption in
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Dobbs wrote, “are built more on a legal convention than on a
precise measurement and this seems to be one of them. But the
amount of the bribe is clearly a good measure for recovery if no
other is to be had and indeed might be better than most
conventional measures.” 200
The Court of Appeals’ circumlocutions and imprecision
illustrate Dobbs’s point above that the amount of the bribe,
although imprecise, is better than alternative measures. 201
Another way to deal with a plaintiff who proves a cause of action
but no damages is to award him nominal damages. However,
courts seem to deal with damages measurement problems in
commercial bribery by defaulting to award the bribe. 202
Because restitution does measure the bribe recipient’s unjust
enrichment (or part of it), it is more analytically sound to identify
the plaintiff’s recovery of the amount of the bribe from the bribee
as restitution rather than compensatory damages. Beyer’s
recovery of the bribe from Aggie even if he lost nothing identifies
his remedy as restitution because the court measures restitution
by the defendant’s gain or unjust enrichment, not to compensate
the plaintiff’s loss. 203
An English court said that recovering the amount of the
bribe was either legal restitution, money had and received, or
damages. 204 Up to this point, it doesn’t matter whether Beyer’s
recovers $8,000 from Aggie as compensatory damages or legal
restitution. Like a successful compensatory damages plaintiff, a
successful legal restitution plaintiff receives a money judgment
Public and Private Contracting in New York, 75 ALB. L. REV. 931, 960 n.209
(2011–2012) (reviewing cases arguing if bribe amount reflected the true
economic damage then bribers would bid lower and not risk prosecution).
200. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 10.6.
201. Id.
202. See id. (“[T]he amount of the bribe is clearly a good measure for
recovery if no other is to be had and indeed might be better than most
conventional measures.”).
203. See BURROWS, REMEDIES, supra note 111, at 616 (“The fact that the
[plaintiff] had not lost anything was irrelevant: the measure of relief, as in all
bribe cases, was therefore indisputably restitutionary.”).
204. See Hovenden & Sons v. Millhoff, (1900) 83 LT 41 (CA) at 43 (Eng.)
(finding that the recovery of a bribe has been interpreted differently, but “it
makes little difference in the case which view is the right one . . . the same
amount is recoverable whether the action is on an indebitatus count or in
damages”). For further discussion, see Roach, supra note 95, at 312.
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that ranks equally with the defendant’s other similar creditors. 205
However, there are differences.
In some circumstances, restitution may be more beneficial to
the plaintiff than compensatory damages. 206 The statute of
limitations may differ between a shorter period to sue for a tort
than for breach of contract or restitution. 207 The time bar for
equitable restitution will usually be laches instead of the statute
of limitations. 208 Tort or breach of contract damages and legal
restitution for money had and received will be tried to a jury in
the United States and lead to a personal money judgment. 209 For
restitution, it is not necessary that the agent diverted a benefit
that would have gone to her principal. 210 An agent’s principal
may recover a bribe from the agent even though it was never
intended for the principal and couldn’t be a lost price discount. 211
In a notable English case, the House of Lords granted the
205. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 60 (AM. LAW INST. 2011); Emily Sherwin, Unjust Enrichment and
Creditors, 27 REV. LITIG. 141, 143 (2007).
206. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 4.1(1) (explaining the
relation between restitution and damages, and in which situations one may be
preferred). See generally Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 944
(8th Cir. 1999).
207. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, 4.1(1) (“For example, if
the statute of limitations has run on damages claims but not on claims for
restitution, the plaintiff will assert unjust enrichment and claim restitution to
take advantage of the statute.”).
208. See id. § 2.4(4) (noting that tradition holds that some statutes of
limitation do not apply to equitable claims”).
209. See First Nat’l Bank of DeWitt v. Cruthis, 203 S.W.3d 88, 94 (Ark.
2005) (finding that the circuit court erred in submitting a count to the jury
because one of the remedies sought was an equitable one not based in contract).
See generally Eric J. Hamilton, Note, Federalism and the State Civil Jury
Rights, 65 STAN. L. REV. 851, 864 (2013).
210. See Savage v. Mayer, 203 P.2d 9, 10 (Cal. 1949) (“All benefits and
advantages acquired by the agent as an outgrowth of the agency . . . are deemed
to have been acquired for the benefit of the principal, and the principal is
entitled to recover such benefits . . . .”). See generally Risvold v. Gustafson, 296
N.W. 411, 412–13 (Minn. 1941).
211. See United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir. 1988)
(explaining that a principal may recover the amount of bribes paid to an agent,
not to compensate the principal for funds that were intended for him, but to
deter agents from taking bribes or similar actions); see also PALMER, THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.11 (“When a fiduciary profits through breach of a
fiduciary obligation, he will be accountable to his principal without regard to
whether or not the profit is at the expense of the principal.”).
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government restitution from Reading, a soldier, who, in an
occupied country, had accepted bribes to accompany smugglers’
trucks through checkpoints. 212 The United Kingdom’s
government would not have solicited or accepted the money
Reading received from the smugglers. But the government,
having seized the bribes, was allowed to retain them to prevent
his unjust enrichment.
F. Equitable Restitution
Restitution for a commercial bribe takes two forms: First,
legal restitution, for money had and received, which was
discussed above. 213
Second, discussed here, is equitable restitution for either a
constructive trust or an accounting-disgorgement. 214 This subtle
subject requires quite a bit of ink because of tracing, jury trial,
and the difference between a money judgment and a personal
order.
1. Constructive Trust
A constructive trust, which we introduce first, differs from an
accounting, which follows. Courts have decided that agents hold
bribes in constructive trust for their principals. 215 Summarizing
212. See Reading v. Attorney Gen., [1951] AC 507 (HL) (Eng.) (“[A]ny official
position, whether marked by a uniform or not, which enables the holder to earn
money by its use gives his master a right to receive the money so earned even
though it was earned by a criminal act.”).
213. See generally supra notes 135–140 and accompanying text.
214. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, §§ 4.3(2), 4.3(5)
(examining the equitable doctrines of constructive trusts and accounting). See
generally PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.11.
215. See United States v. Podell, 572 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding that
the Government was entitled to impress a constructive trust on monies received
by defendant in breach of his fiduciary duty as United States Congressman);
Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 821 F. Supp. 292, 295 n.3,
298 n.6 (D.N.J. 1993) (explaining that “an agent is presumed to act on behalf of
the principal, and therefore any bribes collected by the agent are held in trust
for the principal's benefit”); United States v. King, 469 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D.S.C.
1979) (determining that a consular official breached her fiduciary duty to the
government by accepting bribes, and that the government was thus entitled to a
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the features and effects of tracing and personal orders in a
constructive trust will aid understanding of the differences
between the constructive trust and accounting-disgorgement.
Tracing is a constructive trust’s most important feature. The
plaintiff identifies the constructive trust asset or res as “his
property” and follows or “traces” it. 216 The Restatement explains
that “the effect of constructive trust is to vindicate [the plaintiff’s]
claim to equitable ownership. If the claimant cannot show an
equitable entitlement to specific property in the hands of the
defendant, the underlying basis of the remedy is lost.” 217
The judge enforces a constructive trust with a personal order
to the defendant to execute the trust, to convey the trust asset or
res to the plaintiff. 218 In contrast to the money judgment a
successful legal-restitution plaintiff receives, a prevailing
constructive trust plaintiff’s remedy is the court’s potentially
coercive personal order that requires the defendant to transfer
the asset to him. 219
First, tracing and the court’s in personam order will be
crucial where the trust property or res is in another
jurisdiction. 220 For example, a bribed prosecuting attorney moved
constructive trust on the property purchased with the bribery money); Cent. Ill.
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Schell, 238 Ill. App. 560, 565 (1925) (“[T]he moment [the
appellant] received any part or portion of appellee's money, he became a trustee
ex maleficio, and subject to the jurisdiction of a court of equity. In such case,
equity will impress a constructive trust upon the money in his hands.”); Jaclyn,
Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 406 A.2d 474, 491 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1979) (stating that courts have adopted a rule imposing a constructive trust on
payments received by an agent acting who is acting in a way that is a breach of
fiduciary duty).
216. See Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating
Restitution with Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 973, 992 (2011) [hereinafter Rendleman, Measurement of
Restitution] (providing examples of tracing).
217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55
cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
218. See Pioneer Real Estate, Inc. v. Larese, 762 P.2d 720, 724 (Colo. App.
1988) (“[B]y imposing constructive trust, court awards successful plaintiff
personal order requiring defendant to transfer specific property to plaintiff.”).
219. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 55 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (stating that the court may direct the conditions on
which the constructive trustee must surrender the constructive trust property
to the claimant). See generally PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5,
§ 1.3.
220. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
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the bribe from Hong Kong to New Zealand, where he bought
property. 221 Although the Hong Kong authorities sued him in
New Zealand, a court in either jurisdiction with in personam
power over him would have traced the bribes in Hong Kong into
the New Zealand realty and held that he was a constructive
trustee. 222
Second, a constructive trust plaintiff may trace his asset to
third parties. 223 Suppose Aggie gives an $8,000 money bribe to
her daughter, Anjie. Anjie buys a racehorse named Devil His Due
with the bribe money. Devil His Due finishes second in a
handicap and earns a $16,000 purse. Beyer asks whether the
court will find that Anjie, is a constructive trustee of the money,
and later the horse, and whether the court will trace the bribe
money into the horse, and from the horse into the purse, and
impose a constructive trust against Aggie’s equitable or beneficial
property interest in the purse? “If so,” a court wrote, “a
constructive trust may be deemed imposed upon such funds,
which trust would accordingly follow the ‘beneficial interest’ of
ownership in the true asset.” 224
Third, under the court’s constructive trust, the plaintiff has
an ownership right in the traced trust res. 225 Suppose Aggie
invested $6,000 of Beyer’s bribe money in a Studebaker
automobile that is exempt from her other creditors’ claims. 226 If

§ 55 (AM. LAW INST. 2011)).
221. Attorney Gen. for H.K. v. Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC) 330 (appeal taken
from NZCA) (UK).
222. See generally RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 284–85.
223. See LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 1997) (“It is
universally understood that ‘where a constructive trust has invested
[wrongfully acquired] funds or has purchased other property [with wrongfully
acquired funds], the [party for whose benefit a constructive trust has been
imposed] can follow it wherever it can be traced.’” (citing Trustees of Clients’
Sec. Fund v. Yucht, 578 A.2d 900, 909 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989))); see also
Fed. Republic of Brazil v. Durant Int’l Corp., [2015] UKPC 35, [2016] AC 297
(appeal taken from the Court of Appeal of Jersey) (backwards tracing of bribery
proceeds).
224. Id.
225. See generally GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND
ESTATES § 471 (3d ed. Supp. 2016).
226. See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26(8) (West) (providing that a debtor is entitled
to hold motor vehicles valuing under $6000 exempt from creditor process).
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Sailer can trace the bribe into the Studebaker, he can realize on
it. 227
Fourth, suppose Aggie invested the $8,000 bribe in a stock
that doubled in value. As foreshadowed by examples of the
houses in New Zealand and the horserace purse above, a
plaintiff’s constructive trust will capture the trust res’s gain in
value or appreciation for the plaintiff. 228
Fifth, the plaintiff’s equitable ownership interest in the asset
enables the plaintiff to realize on the asset and to outrank the
defendant’s unsecured creditors in it. 229 Suppose that Aggie owes
$40,000 to another creditor, Crayon, but has only one asset, a
$10,000 bribe. If the court declares Aggie a constructive trustee
for Beyer, then Beyer will recover in full, while Crayon will
recover nothing. 230 On the other hand, if Beyer recovers a money
judgment for compensatory damages, an accounting, or legal
restitution, money had and received variety, then, in a
bankruptcy or other distribution, Beyer and Crayon share the
$10,000 asset pro rata, proportional to the amount of their
respective debts, 20% and 80%, $2,000 and $8,000 respectively. 231
227. See Maki v. Chong, 75 P.3d 376, 379–80 (Nev. 2003) (providing that the
exemption “homestead” protection does not apply to assets obtained with
fraudulently acquired funds); Cox v. Waudby, 433 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Iowa 1988)
(“As a general proposition, a party in whose favor a constructive trust has been
established may trace the property to where it is held and may reach whatever
has been obtained through the use of it, including profits or income generated
through its use.”). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 55 cmt. d, 58 cmt. g, 58 reporter’s note g (AM. LAW INST.
2011); PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.15(a).
228. See generally Attorney Gen. for H.K. v. Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC) 330
(appeal taken from NZCA) (UK); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(2) illus. 18 (AM. LAW INST. 2011); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. e, illus. 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
229. See Reid, 1 AC at 324 (describing the level of priority among creditors);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. d (AM.
LAW INST. 2011) (stating the uses of a constructive trust as a means to priority).
For additional examples, see United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 308 (1910);
ITT Cmty. Dev. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1360–62 (5th Cir. 1978); United States
v. King, 469 F. Supp. 167, 170–71 (D.S.C. 1979).
230. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
231. See Sherwin, supra note 205, at 143 (explaining that a constructive
trust has priority over unsecured creditors, and that a plaintiff without a
constructive trust would not have a higher priority).
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Tracing that favors a constructive trust plaintiff over the
defendant’s other creditors has been controversial because,
unlike the defendant, the defendant’s other creditors are not
wrongdoers. 232 The Restatement of Restitution gives the judge
discretion to subordinate a constructive-trust plaintiff’s recovery
to the defendant’s innocent unsecured creditors. 233
An old-fashioned court might think that a commercial
bribery plaintiff’s money judgment for legal restitution, money
had and received, is the plaintiff’s adequate remedy at law. 234 A
modern court’s analysis would be more likely to be more
functional and to focus on whether the plaintiff needs a feature of
the constructive trust like tracing. 235 Discussing the “erosion” of
the inadequacy test when a plaintiff who could recover legal
restitution seeks an equitable remedy, the late Professor Palmer
observed that “remedial law can be applied both more easily and
more sensibly when courts are able to give the relief called for by
the facts.” 236
232. See PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 4.10(a)
(providing an overview of how some courts have or have not justified tracing);
James Rogers, Indeterminacy and the Law of Restitution, 68 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1377, 1399–1405 (2011) (exploring whether or not it is valid to give
preference to the claim of a creditor who can trace over the claims of creditors
who cannot trace); Peter Watts, Bribes and Constructive Trusts, 110 L.Q. REV.
178, 179 (1994) (“[T]o give a proprietary remedy to a person who may have
suffered no loss and who in any event would have other recourse, will, according
to principle, operate to the prejudice of a person who, quite innocent of the
source of the asset, lends money on an equitable security . . . . ”); Dale Oesterle,
Restitution and Reform, 79 MICH. L. REV. 336, 359 (1980) (book review) (arguing
that tracing should not be allowed outside the context of a fiduciary
relationship).
233. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§§ 55 illus. 3, 61 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“The relative advantages of specific
restitution make it virtually certain that [plaintiff’s] remedy will instead be a
decree that [defendant] holds [the property] in constructive trust for
[plaintiff].”).
234. See Waters v. Boyden, 176 N.E. 535, 566 (Mass. 1931) (“In such
circumstances the plaintiffs have a complete remedy at law and the bill should
not be retained merely because the obligation of the defendant is equitable as
well as legal.”).
235. See Cty. of Cook v. Barrett, 344 N.E.2d 540, 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)
(rejecting the defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s adequate remedy at law
precluded a constructive trust).
236. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 1.6. See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 (AM. LAW
INST. 2011).
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2. Accounting-Disgorgement

An accounting is our second form of equitable restitution. An
accounting is restitution for the defendant’s wrong. 237 The
Restatement of Restitution combines accounting with
disgorgement; it requires defendant’s intentional misconduct,
which includes defendant’s intentional tort and breach of her
fiduciary duty. 238 The accounting defendant gives up her gains
from third parties instead of giving back gains she obtained from
the plaintiff. 239 Accounting lacks both of the constructive trust
characteristics: it neither requires nor allows tracing and it ends
with a money judgment that ranks equally with the defendant’s
other unsecured debts. 240
The successful accounting plaintiff’s measure of recovery is
the greater of the defendant’s “net profit” or the gain’s “market
The
court
measures
the
plaintiff’s
value.” 241
accounting-disgorgement restitution by the defendant’s gain from
third-party sources, recovery that may exceed the plaintiff’s
loss. 242 A court imposes the harsh measurement rules of
accounting-disgorgement restitution to “eliminate the possibility
of [defendant’s] profit from conscious wrongdoing.” 243 As defined
in the Restatement, contemporary accounting-disgorgement
237. See Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution, supra note 216, at 994
(“Accounting . . . is a vehicle for equitable restitution that is not based on a res
or fund . . . [I]t captures the defendant’s gains from other sources.”).
238. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 51 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (noting that restitution measured by a
defendant’s wrongdoing has been referred to as both a “disgorgement” and as an
“accounting”).
239. See Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution, supra note 216, at 994–95
(explaining that a successful accounting plaintiff is not limited to recovering
only her former property, but may capture gains obtained from other sources).
240. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 51 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (describing the relation of asset based remedies
in restitution and stating that the successful accounting plaintiffs have a
judgment that ranks equally with the rights of competing creditors and
unsecured creditors); WILLIAM DE FUNIAK, A HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY
§ 103 (2d ed. 1956) (explaining the priority of an accounting judgment). See
generally PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 1.5(c).
241. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
242. Id.
243. Id. § 51 cmt. c, 3.
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includes a third-party wrongdoer unrelated to the plaintiff and is
not limited to fiduciary relationships, but it turns on the
defendant’s intentional misconduct leading to unjust
enrichment. 244
Accounting is a complex and confusing subject, primarily
because it has not shed its accumulated pre-merger barnacles. 245
Professor Eichengrun wrote that accounting functions as several
different remedies. 246 The equitable bill of accounting began to
compel an express trustee to account to the trust’s beneficiaries
for the management of the trust, which was under the Chancery
court’s exclusive jurisdiction. 247 Accounting was extended to an
accounting incidental to another equitable remedy, a constructive
trust. 248 A contemporary accounting can accompany a
constructive trust, but today an accounting plaintiff need not
trace, identify an asset, 249 an injunction, 250 or specific
performance. 251 An accounting for discovery is obsolete because
contemporary civil discovery rules apply to all lawsuits. 252 The
244. Id. § 51. See generally Joel Eichengrun, Remedying the Remedy of
Accounting, 60 IND. L.J. 463, 482–83 (1985).
245. See Cleland v. Stadt, 670 F. Supp. 814, 818 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(complexity); People ex rel. Hartigan v. Candy Club, 501 N.E.2d 188, 190 (Ill.
App. 1986) (discovery); Jackson v. Cty. of Douglas, 388 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Neb.
1986) (complexity).
246. Eichengrun, supra note 244, at 482–83.
247. See id. at n.29 (speaking to the historical development of the bill of
accounting).
248. See Rust v. Kelly, 741 P.2d 786, 787 (Mont. 1987) (applying an
accounting to members of joint land development venture); Palazzo v. Palazzo,
503 N.Y.S.2d 381, 384 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (same in divorce proceeding);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 2011) (relating the principle of accounting to other remedies,
including a constructive trust).
249. See Newby v. Enron, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 706 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (“A
plaintiff seeking an equitable accounting rather than a constructive trust need
not identify a particular asset or fund of money in the defendant’s possession to
which she is entitled.”).
250. See Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916)
(“[T]he jurisdiction must be rested upon some other equitable ground—in
ordinary cases, as in the present, the right to an injunction. . . .”).
251. Eichengrun, supra note 244, at 482.
252. See Alts. Unlimited, Inc. v. New Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 843
A.2d 252, 307–08 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (“It is now clear, moreover, that
whereas an equitable claim for an accounting once served a necessary discovery
function, that function has been superseded by modern rules of discovery.”). For
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Supreme Court in Dairy Queen v. Wood 253 de-emphasized the
claimant’s need for an accounting when the parties’ accounts are
complicated because of the judge’s ability to appoint a master. 254
Accounting wasidentified with fiduciary relations like a trustee of
an express trust, above, or the agent-principal relationships here
examined. 255
Because the plaintiff’s remedy for accounting-disgorgement
is a money judgment, the question arises whether the parties
have a constitutional right to a jury trial under the federal or
state constitutions. There are two dominant tests for a federal
constitutional jury right: the remedies test, which is the most
important, and the historical test. 256 The issue of jury trial for an
accounting is complex because it merges three amorphous and
unfamiliar terms: equity, fiduciary, and accounting.
In Dairy Queen, the leading Supreme Court decision
examining accounting under the federal Seventh Amendment,
Justice Black held that a franchiser’s lawsuit for an “accounting”
seeking breach of contract and trademark infringement remedies
from a former franchisee led to a right to a jury. 257 Dairy Queen is
subject to at least three varying interpretations, 258 which we
discuss below.
Dairy Queen followed a remedies test for jury trial. Under a
historical test, however, an accounting is equitable. 259 Following
further discussion, see Eichengrun, supra note 244, at 475–76.
253. 369 U.S. 459, 478 (1962).
254. Id.
255. Eichengrum, supra note 244, at 474 (iterating that accounting typically
arose in cases involving a fiduciary relationship).
256. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987) (“We reiterate our
previously expressed view that characterizing the relief sought is ‘more
important’ than finding a precisely analogous common-law cause of action in
determining whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial.”). For
further analysis of the two tests, see RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at
345–47.
257. See id. at 477–78 (declaring that a right to a jury trial is not dependent
on the litigant’s “choice of words used in the pleadings,” but that the court must
examine the circumstances of the case to determine if it gives rise to a jury trial
or not).
258. See Black & Decker Corp. v. Positec USA, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 3d 1056,
1059 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (describing the various ways courts have applied to
determine whether a jury trial is guaranteed ).
259. See Phillips v. Kaplus, 864 F.2d 807, 813 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that
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a historical test, money defendant obtained from plaintiff by
abuse of fiduciary of confidential relationship is equitable. 260 The
lack of a coercive remedy is irrelevant. Courts have held an
accounting will not be tried to a jury. 261
Because of the remedies test, my answer to the jury trial
question is an inconclusive one. 262 If the plaintiff’s complaint
demands money, then a jury right may exist. 263 A restitution
plaintiff’s recovery of money is usually legal restitution. 264 Legal
restitution includes plaintiff’s recovery of a converter’s proceeds
from a profitable sale, traditionally named waiver of tort and suit
in assumpsit. 265 An accounting that leads to a money judgment,
not a trust or a lien, may be subject to a jury right under Dairy
Queen. 266 An accounting decision that is a non-coercive money
judgment “might be thought to require a jury trial.” 267
accounting is “traditionally” equitable); DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note
111, § 2.6(3) (“The remedy known as accounting or accounting for profits is
usually regarded as equitable, but it can ultimately resemble a money
judgment.”); PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.12 (“[R]ecovery
of profits is associated with equitable accounting . . . .”).
260. See generally PALMER, supra note 5, §§ 1.3, 1.6.
261. See Kaplus, 864 F.2d at 813 (finding that accounting is “traditionally”
equitable); Levitin v. Rosenthal, 903 F. Supp. 400, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“An
accounting is an action in equity to be tried by the court without a jury . . . .”);
Dick v. Dick, 355 A.2d 110, 116 (Conn. 1974) (“It is well settled that ‘where the
essential right asserted is equitable in its nature and damages are sought in
lieu of equitable relief or as supplemental to it . . . the whole action is one in
equity and there is no right to a jury trial.”). See generally Henderson v. Ayres
& Hartnett, P.C., 740 S.E.2d 518, 522 (Va. 2013); Van de Kamp v. Bank of Am.,
251 Cal. Rptr. 530, 552–54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) .
262. See Caprice Roberts, Supreme Disgorgement, 67 FLA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 10) (discussing the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
263. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, §§ 2.6(3) n.22, 4.3(5)
(accounting for profits is like a money judgment); 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2310 (3d ed. 1998) (“An accounting remedy is similar
to a damage remedy, . . . .”).
264. See Colleen Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 56 SMU L.
REV. 1572, 1598–1607 (2002) (explaining the legal and equitable “facets” of
restitution).
265. See PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 1.5 (providing
examples of when courts have allowed a plaintiff to recover the proceeds of a
sale when goods were wrongfully converted).
266. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 2.6(3) (speaking to the
application of Dairy Queen in subsequent cases).
267. Id. § 2.6(3).
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On the other hand, Dairy Queen may mean that a pleader
cannot avoid a jury trial by characterizing a breach of contract
claim for damages as equitable by re-naming it an accounting. 268
If the plaintiff calls contract damages an accounting, then the
novel characterization of “common law” as equitable will fail; the
plaintiff’s claim will be subject to the litigants’ jury right. 269
The constructive trust and the equitable lien are asset-based
or proprietary remedies because the defendant’s unjust
enrichment originated with the plaintiff. 270 An accounting is not
an asset-based or proprietary remedy; the defendant’s unjust
enrichment came from others, not the plaintiff. 271 In the
commercial bribery dispute we are following, defendant Aggie is
liable to the plaintiff and must account for or disgorge her unjust
enrichment. But the fund originated from Sailer, a third person,
not from Beyer, the plaintiff. If the plaintiff seeks restitution of
defendant’s gains from other sources, is that claim legal or
equitable? Courts have required a jury for the plaintiff to recover
defendant’s profits from copyright infringement and trademark
infringement. 272

268. See Phillips v. Kaplus, 764 F.2d 807, 814 (11th Cir. 1985) (examining
whether the case at issue was truly equitable or if it was a case typically settled
at law that was being disguised as an equitable claim); Douglas Laycock, Death
of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 757–58 (1991) (“A few
plaintiffs may manipulate the choice of remedy to deprive defendants of their
right to jury trial, but this risk does not extend widely . . . . This risk of
manipulation in a small number of cases cannot justify a preference for legal
remedies in all cases.”).
269. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962) (“The constitutional
right to trial by jury cannot be made to depend upon the choice of words used in
the pleadings.”).
270. See generally Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution, supra note 216.
271. See id. at 994 (“Accounting . . . captures the defendant’s gains from
other sources.”).
272. See Black & Decker Corp. v. Positec USA, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 3d 1056,
1065 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (discussing the conflicting precedent and other courts’
confused and muddled reasoning and finding a jury right in a case concerning
patent infringement). The decision in Black & Decker Corp. may be based on the
idea that because restitution is “equitable,” there is no right to a jury trial, a
mistake referred to as the “equity fallacy” in Rendleman & Roberts, supra note
1, at 493–94. See generally, Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald’s
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Will the judge employ a coercive order to pay to enforce an
accounting remedy? 273 An order to turn over property or money
that the judge has found the defendant possesses does not
imprison the defendant to collect a civil debt. 274 However, an
order to pay a money judgment enforced by coercive contempt
may lead to the defendant’s imprisonment to collect a civil
debt. 275 The possibility of coercive confinement militates against
an equitable classification of accounting. 276
In personam relief—the judge’s order to the defendant to
convey—is equitable. 277 The plaintiff’s claim that requires
tracing, enforced by a judge with an order to convey, is
equitable. 278 Tracing for either profit-based restitution or specific
restitution to reach another asset is equitable in United States
law. 279 The plaintiff may need to trace the res through changes in
form or into the hands of a third person or because the defendant
is insolvent. 280
If an accounting plaintiff is suing to recover a fund that has
been traced, the case seems to be equitable, and therefore not
subject to a constitutional jury right. My tentative answer is to
advise an equitable restitution plaintiff who traces and seeks to
avoid a jury trial to sue for a constructive trust with a possible
coercive remedy.
My tentative solution for the right to a jury trial is, first, to
subscribe to a remedies test for the right to a jury trial and,
second, to approve a constitutional right to jury trial for an
accounting that will lead to a money judgment rather than to a
coercive order.
273.
274.

See generally DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, §§ 1.1, 2.6(3).
See generally DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS,
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT 703–04 (2010).
275. See id. at 702–703 (providing examples of when a court uses coercive
contempt to enforce a court ordered monetary obligation).
276. See id. at 790–91 (coercive contempt may violate the prohibition
against debtors’ prisons).
277. For examples and discussion of the intersection of equity and in
personam jurisdiction, see Howard W. Brill, The Maxims of Equity, 1993 ARK. L.
NOTES 29, 30.
278. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.12.
279. See generally id. § 2.14.
280. For more extensive discussion, see Murphy, supra note 264, at 1598–
1607.
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Professor Kull—later the Restatement’s Reporter—expressed
the difficulty of administering the law-equity characterization
when he wrote that the plaintiff’s restitution against the
intentional converter is either legal or equitable. 281
It is appropriate to conclude my discussion of the
constitutional jury right in an accounting by emphasizing its
tentative nature. A recent accounting decision where a
trademark plaintiff sued to recover defendant’s profits may have
been based on the unexpressed incorrect premise that all
restitution is equitable. 282 The court found a constitutional right
to jury; it based its conclusion on the idea that the plaintiff’s
trademark infringement claim for an accounting of the
defendant’s profits stemmed from policies of unjust enrichment,
deterrence, and compensation. 283 The accounting was
compensatory because defendant’s profits may be a “proxy” or
“rough measure” that can measure plaintiff’s damages. 284
3. Constructive Trust or Accounting?
Sometimes either a constructive trust or an accounting will
be appropriate. When the defendant still has the money and does
not have any other creditors, there is not any difference between
an accounting and a constructive trust. 285
Suppose Sailer bribed Aggie with $8,000 in cash that Aggie
later invested in a propitious commodity trade that doubled its
281. Andrew Kull, Restitution and the Noncontractual Transfer, 11 J. CONT.
L. 93, 100 (1997).
282. See Black & Decker Corp. v. Positec USA, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 3d 1056,
1064 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (resolving that a trademark holder had a Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial on claims demanding alleged infringers’ profits).
283. See id. at 1061 (finding that an accounting in the context of a
trademark infringement case may be based on “unjust enrichment, deterrence,
and compensation”).
284. See id. at 1067 (“Plaintiffs appear to have a viable theory that profits
serve as a proxy for damages.”).
285. See Matthew Harding, Constructive Trusts and Distributive Justice, in
PRINCIPLES OF PROPRIETARY REMEDIES 20, 34 (Elise Bant & Michael Bryan eds.,
2013) (“Note, though, that if an account of profits is able to achieve the same
measure of disgorgement as a constructive trust, it might be neither here nor
there, from the perspective of distributive justice, which remedy is awarded (at
least in a two party case).”).
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value. May Beyer recover $16,000? According to constructive
trust tracing principles, the plaintiff’s recovery would include the
gains and profits she made. 286 Strict constructive trust reasoning
leads to stripping all profit from the fiduciary. 287 An agent who
invests the bribe successfully is responsible to “account for all the
profits of [her] wrongdoing to the principal, consistently with the
courts goal of maintaining ‘a very high standard of conduct on the
part of fiduciaries.’” 288 The counterargument is that the agent
should account for only the bribe because her gains and profits
cannot be traced back to either the plaintiff’s asset or the
plaintiff’s opportunity. 289
In two foundational decisions, one American, the other
British, the defendants published books based on national
security information and received royalties from their
publishers. 290 Each court imposed a constructive trust on its
defendant’s royalties in favor of the respective governments. 291
The United States Supreme Court found that Snepp, the
defendant in Snepp v. United States, 292 had breached a fiduciary
duty as a substantive prerequisite for the constructive trust. 293
The House of Lords based its constructive trust on the defendant
Blake’s breach of contract. 294
286. See Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution, supra note 216, at 992–93
(explaining that tracing ends where the money ends and that the plaintiff may
recover profits as long as she can trace to them).
287. See id. at 994 (describing the mechanisms of strict tracing).
288. Charles Mitchell, Civil Liability for Bribery, 117 L.Q. REV. 207, 213
(2001). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT §§ 51(4), 55(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
289. See generally id. § 61 cmt. b.
290. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Attorney Gen. v. Blake,
[2001] 1 AC 268 (HL).
291. See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 515 (“A constructive trust, on the other hand,
protects both the Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a breach of trust.”);
Blake, [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL) (“[C]ircumstances do arise when the just response
to a breach of contract is that the wrongdoer should not be permitted to retain
any profit from the breach.”).
292. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
293. Id. at 515. The Supreme Court didn’t adjust the amount of the
constructive trust for the time Snepp spent writing the book. Id.
294. See Blake, [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL) (comparing the case at bar to Blake
and noting the number of factual similarities). Although in some contexts the
difference between a constructive trust and an accounting is important, the
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Although Beyer can respond that the bribe Aggie received
from Sailer was a discount that he was entitled to receive, 295 the
argument that the seller’s bribe was built back into the price the
principal paid the seller fails completely in both national security
decisions. 296 Snepp’s and Blake’s enrichment came from the book
buyers and the publishers, not the governments; neither was
enriched at the expense of the government. 297 Both plaintiffs
wanted their agents to follow their covenants. 298 Each would
have eschewed royalties from an agent’s book that it did not want
published. Neither the “at the expense of” nor the “discount”
description explains the decisions.
The late Professor Peter Birks rejected the concept of a
constructive trust with tracing unless the defendant’s enrichment
was subtracted from the plaintiff’s ownership. 299 In technical
restitution language, the defendants’ enrichment did not come
“at the expense of” the governments. Neither diverted a benefit
that would otherwise have gone to his government. As discussed
above, the Restatement of Restitution rejected Birks’s argument
for giving-up restitution. 300 Although section one of the
Restatement states that defendant’s enrichment must be “at the
expense of” a plaintiff, “at the expense of” can mean the
defendant may have acquired title “in violation of the [plaintiff’s]
rights.” 301
Restatement of Restitution is indifferent to the substantive basis, contract vs.
fiduciary, that leads to the constructive trust. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2011); see
also Roy Ryden Anderson, The Compensatory Disgorgement Alternative to
Restatement Third's New Remedy for Breach of Contract, 68 SMU L. REV. 953,
1001–03 nn.294–311 (2015) (Snepp’s fiduciary obligation “concocted”; Blake’s
constructive trust “carefully reasoned”).
295. See Cty. of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 848, 855–57 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2007) (discussing the defendant’s argument that the county did not
incur any damage by his taking of bribes, and ultimately rejecting the
argument).
296. See infra notes 274–279.
297. See generally Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Attorney
Gen. v. Blake, [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL).
298. Snepp, 444 U.S.; Blake, [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL).
299. BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 129, at 387–89.
300. See generally supra note 216 and accompanying text.
301. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 1
cmt. 1, 51 (AM. LAW INST. 2011); see also Cty. of Cook v. Barrett, 344 N.E.2d 540,
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A court may require a constructive trust plaintiff to trace its
asset into the defendant’s hands. 302 Equitable restitution
implemented through a constructive trust gave the government a
special priority right in Snepp’s and Blake’s enrichment. 303 In
Snepp and Blake, however, some would maintain, accounting or
disgorgement would be a more technically accurate remedy than
a constructive trust. 304
What supports the courts’ decisions to award the plaintiffs
constructive trusts and special priority rights in the defendants’
royalties? If the defendants had other creditors, were the
royalties sufficiently identified with the plaintiffs or with the
defendants’ wrongs to qualify for constructive trust status? The
chancellor in Daraydan Holdings, Limited v. Sollard
International, Limited305 wrote:
There are powerful policy reasons for ensuring that a fiduciary
does not retain gains acquired in violation of fiduciary duty,
and I do not consider that it should make any difference
whether the fiduciary is insolvent. There is no injustice to the
[fiduciary’s] creditors in their not sharing in an asset for
which the fiduciary has not given value, and which the
fiduciary should not have had. 306

We think that the respective governments’ claims to
royalties would outrank Snepp’s and Blake’s other creditors.
Similarly, Aggie’s enrichment came from Sailer. Was Aggie
unjustly enriched “at the expense” of Beyer? Unlike Aggie and
544 (Ill. Ct. App. 1975) (rejecting the argument that defendant’s enrichment
from the briber was not “at the expense” of plaintiff).
302. See Bender v. CenTrust Mort. Corp., 51 F.3d 1027, 1030 (11th Cir.
1995) (“[I]t is well settled that Florida courts will impress property with a
constructive trust only if the trust res is specific, identifiable property or if it
can be clearly traced in assets of the defendant which are claimed by the party
seeking such relief.” (citation omitted)).
303. See generally Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Attorney
Gen. v. Blake, [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL).
304. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 51 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
305. [2004] EWHC (Ch.) 662 [86] (Eng.).
306. Id. Disagreeing, Professor Burrows wrote that “[I]t is hard to see why a
victim claiming restitution for a wrong should have priority on the wrongdoer’s
insolvency given that a compensation-claimant does not have such priority.”
ANDREW BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 687 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter
BURROWS, RESTITUTION]; see also BURROWS, REMEDIES, supra note 111, at 619.
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the agent-defendant in Daraydan Holdings, Snepp and Blake
were not the kind of agent-fiduciaries who manage property or
conduct business for a principal. 307 Their governments cannot
argue that the defendants diverted royalties that would have
otherwise accrued to them. If Aggie’s enrichment came from
Sailer, do the preceding points support giving Beyer a
constructive trust with priority rights over Aggie and her other
creditors? The principal’s trust and confidence, and the need to
suppress bribery, both support tracing. 308 The origin of the bribe
militates against it.
A constructive trust that captures the trust res’s
appreciation may, however, under some circumstances, be too
generous to the plaintiff. Another possible equitable remedy is an
equitable lien in the particular asset; that remedy would allow
the plaintiff to trace the bribe money, award the plaintiff a
security interest in it, and let the plaintiff recover it without
capturing its appreciation. 309 If a constructive trust, in Dobbs’s
words, “overkills,” then the judge may impose an equitable
lien. 310 If the defendant is insolvent and the commercial-bribery
plaintiff is competing with the defendant’s creditors who were not
connected with the defendant’s wrong, the Australian court in
Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining N.L. (No. 2), 311 suggested
awarding the plaintiff an equitable lien instead of a constructive
trust. 312
Under United Kingdom law, the difference between the two
forms of equitable restitution, constructive trust or an
accounting, becomes critical. In 2014 in FHR European Ventures,

307. For a description of the roles of Snepp and Blake in their respective
cases, see Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) and Attorney General. v.
Blake, [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL).
308. See United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir. 1988) (“A
constructive trust is imposed on the bribes not because Holzer intercepted
money intended for the state or failed to account for money received on the
state’s account but in order to deter bribery by depriving the bribed official of
the benefit of the bribes.”).
309. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 56 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
310. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, §§ 4.3(2), 4.3(3).
311. [2012] 200 FCR 296 (Austl.).
312. Id.

COMMERCIAL BRIBERY

421

LLP v. Mankarious, 313 the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
considered a secret commission a buyer had paid to the seller’s
agent. 314 Was the seller’s remedy an accounting or a constructive
trust?
The difference was important. An accounting eschews
tracing for a personal remedy, a judgment for money. 315 The
United Kingdom remedy of constructive trust is “proprietary,”
not “remedial.” The plaintiff traces his property—the trust res—
and both captures the defendant’s investment gain and outranks
defendant’s other creditors in the asset.
The distinction between the constructive trust and
accounting—Etherton, L.J., wrote for the Court of Appeal
below—had been “difficult to fit coherently into a neat set of
rules.” 316 Policy was difficult for the Court of Appeal to sort out:
In considering those matters, there are important issues of
policy, and the relative importance of different policies, to
assess, including deterring fraud and corruption; the ability to
strip the fiduciary of all benefits, including increases in the
value of benefits, acquired by breach of duty, and vehicles or
third parties through which those benefits have been
channelled; the importance attached to the protection of those
to whom fiduciary duties are owed; and the position of other
creditors on the fiduciary’s insolvency who may be prejudiced
by a constructive trust or proprietary relief in favour of the
fiduciary’s principal but who, in the absence of such a trust
and relief, would benefit from increases in value of assets
acquired by the fiduciary’s fraud, corruption or wrongdoing. It
will also be necessary to bear in mind the international
perspective applying to this area of trust law and equity, to
which I have referred earlier in this judgment. 317

Because of the United Kingdom’s constructive trust’s
property base and unruly precedents, the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom’s decision in Mankarious took on some of the
313. [2014] UKSC 45 (appeal taken from EWCA Civ).
314. Id.; FHR European Ventures, LLP v. Mankarious, [2013] EWCA (Civ)
17 (appeal taken from EWCA Ch. Div.).
315. See generally Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Tex.
2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt.
b (AM. LAW INST. 2011); PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 1.5(c).
316. Mankarious, [2013] EWCA (Civ) 17 at para. 15.
317. Id. at para. 116.
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earmarks of driving a square peg into a round hole. The court
appears to have located the seller’s asset in a price that
seemingly had been increased by the amount of the bribe. 318 The
court examined tangled and unruly precedent:
It shows that the mere fact that the fiduciary obtains the
benefit from a third party, or obtains a benefit that could
never be or would never be obtained by the principal, or that
the principal has obtained what he or she wanted or intended
from the opportunity, is not necessarily a bar to a constructive
trust of the benefit wrongly obtained by the fiduciary by
taking advantage of the opportunity. 319

The bent agent, the court found, held the secret commission
as a constructive trustee. 320
The agent always accounts to the principal for the amount of
the bribe “by way of equitable compensation,” a personal and
restitutionary remedy. 321 In addition, the agent may hold the
bribe in a constructive trust. 322 The Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom stated the rule: in some cases, “where an agent acquires
a benefit which came to his notice as a result of his fiduciary
position or pursuant to an opportunity which results from his
fiduciary position,” the court will treat the agent as having
acquired the asset “on behalf of his principal” and treat the
principal as the beneficial owner. 323 Does the rule apply to a
bribe, an asset that cannot be traced to the principal? 324
The issue is whether the principal’s recovery of the agent’s
bribe is a “proprietary claim” “held by the agent on [constructive]
trust for his principal” or is the principal’s claim “for equitable
compensation in a sum equal to the bribe.” 325 The court noted the
318. Id. at para. 67 (“What Investor Group has been deprived of is the
opportunity to have purchased the hotel for up to €10 million less than they
paid for it.”).
319. Id. at para. 100.
320. FHR European Ventures, LLP v. Cedar Capitol Partners, LLC, [2014]
UKSC 45 [para. 7] (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)).
321. Id. at para. 6.
322. See id. at para. 7 (explaining that the principal can elect between a
propriety remedy and a personal remedy against the agent).
323. Id.
324. See id. at para. 7–9 (stating that the “rule” has been strictly applied in
numerous cases).
325. Id. at para. 1.
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two differences between the constructive trust and the
accounting: the constructive trust plaintiff who holds a
proprietary claim (1) may trace and (2) outranks the agent’s
general creditors in the asset. 326 Does the principal also have a
proprietary remedy?
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom cited the Privy
Council’s decision in Attorney General v. Reid, 327 which held that
the bribed prosecuting attorney held the bribe money as a
constructive trust that can be traced to his house. 328 The Court
adduced several policy reasons to support its decision that the
bribe led to a constructive trust, not an account: to suppress
anomalies, to regard the bribe as a potential price reduction, and
to deter bribes. 329
The court did not think that bribes had much effect on the
agent’s general creditors. 330 Other common law jurisdictions,
Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, the United States, and
Canada, consider that all benefits are in trust. 331 Courts should
learn from each other and harmonize the common law. 332 In fact,
326. See id. at para. 42 (discussing that if a principal has a proprietary
claim to the bribe, he can trace and follow it in equity and that if the agent
becomes insolvent, a propriety claim would give the principal priority over
agent’s unsecured creditors).
327. Attorney General for H.K. v. Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC) 330 (appeal
taken from NZCA) (UK).
328. See FHR European Ventures, LLP v. Cedar Capitol Partners, LLC
[2014] UKSC 45 [para. 28] (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)) (describing the
reasoning of the Privy Council in Attorney General for Hong Kong v. Reid [1994]
1 AC 324 (PC) 330 (appeal taken from NZCA) (UK)).
329. See id. at para. 42 (“Wider policy considerations also support the
respondents’ case that bribes and secret commissions received by an agent
should be treated as property of his principal, rather than merely giving rise to
a claim for equitable compensation.”).
330. See id. at para. 43 (explaining that a bribe would not have much of an
effect on the agent’s creditors because the proceeds of a bribe should not be in
the agent’s estate and bribes often reduce the benefit of the relevant transaction
and can fairly be said to be property of the principal).
331. See FHR European Ventures, LLP v. Mankarious, [2013] EWCA (Civ)
17 [para. 80] (appeal taken from EWCA (Ch)) (explaining that the law in
England and Wales differs not only from Australia, but also New Zealand,
Singapore, Canada and some United States jurisdictions).
332. See Cedar Capitol Partners, [2014] UKSC 4 at para. 46 (“[I]t seems to
us highly desirable for all those jurisdictions to learn from eachother, and at
least to lean in favor of harmonizing the development of the common law round
the world.”).
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the events and contracts in the lawsuit were in foreign nations on
the continent, but United Kingdom law applied, probably because
of a choice-of-law clause. 333
One questionable feature of the decision was to reject the
remedial constructive trust and to retain artificial property-based
constructive trust. 334 If the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom had followed Australian Judge Paul Finn’s 2012
decision in Grimaldi v. Chameleon Mining N.L. (No 2), 335 it
would have spared itself from technical distinctions and a labored
conclusion. Although Grimaldi involved corporate misconduct,
Judge Finn discussed the closely related bribery precedents. 336
The United Kingdom constructive trust is property-based: it
“requires a claimant to show that he previously owned the very
property in which he now claims an interest, or else that the
defendant acquired this property in exchange for property that
was previously owned by the claimant.” 337 In the United
Kingdom, a constructive trust is “yes” or “no” depending on
matching the facts with the elements. The judge lacks
discretion. 338
Judge Finn’s policy-based approach is functional; it rejects a
property prerequisite in favor of results that implement relevant
policies. 339 He based the distinction between a constructive trust
and accounting on “the cardinal principal of equity that the
remedy must be fashioned to fit the nature of the case and the
particular facts.” 340 The defendant’s constructive trust is “not

333. Id. at para. 24; FHR European Ventures v. Mankarious [2011] EWHC
2308 (Ch). [24].
334. See generally FHR European Ventures v. Mankarious [2014] UKSC 45
[47] (Ch.).
335. [2012] 200 FCR 296 (Austl.).
336. Id at 418–23.
337. GOFF & JONES, THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 37-10 (Charles
Mitchell, Paul Mitchell & Stephen Watterson eds., 8th ed. 2011). Professor
Burrows is less technical. The defendant’s unjust enrichment “exists in . . . [the
defendant’s] surviving asset.” BURROWS, RESTITUTION, supra note 306, at 173.
338. GOFF & JONES, supra note 337, at 38-17.
339. See Grimaldi [2012] 200 FCR 296 at 403 (“It is the case that, in many
instances and for many types of equitable wrong, the remedy that is the most
appropriate will self select absent unusual circumstances.”).
340. Id.
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based on inflexible formulae.” 341 The “liability arises as a matter
of conscience not of property.” 342 Property-based United Kingdom
constructive trust law is too narrow, in part because it rejects
discretion in choosing a constructive trust. 343 In Australia, a
bribe leads to a constructive trust: the plaintiff captures the
profits the defendant earned with the trust money. 344
Judge Finn found principles of confinement in appropriate
and practical justice. 345 Discretion to award a remedy means not
always awarding it. 346 The countervailing considerations are
predictability, avoiding excessive recovery, whether another
appropriate remedy exists, and consideration of the parties’
future relations. A constructive trust is not “penal;” its purpose is
to prevent the defendant’s unjust enrichment, not to punish
him. 347 Finally, if the plaintiff seeks to capture the constructive
trust asset’s appreciation, the judge’s discretion may adjust the
measurement of the constructive trust for the defendant’s time
and skill spent in achieving that appreciation. 348
Judge Finn’s decision boosts the precedential value of the
Privy Council’s decision in Reid 349 over earlier incongruent
United Kingdom decisions. But he observed in the same
paragraph that Australia disagrees with Reid on when a
341. Id. at 357–58. See generally GOFF & JONES, supra note 337, at 37-24.
342. Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining N.L. (No. 2) [2012] 200 FCR 296, 381
(Austl.).
343. Id. at 420.
344. Id. at 420, 431.
345. See id. at 403 (referencing “the ‘principle of appropriateness’ and the
requirement to do ‘practical justice’”).
346. See id. at 423 (indicating that a constructive trust need not necessarily
be imposed if there are other orders capable of doing full justice).
347. See id. at 406, 410 (explaining that because a constructive trust is
confined to profits actually made, its purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment,
not to punish); see also United States v. Project on Gov’t Oversight, 572 F. Supp.
2d 73, 77 (D.D.C. 2008) (arguing that disgorgement may not be used punitively).
348. Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining N.L. (No. 2) [2012] 200 FCR 296, 410,
450, 453 (Austl.). Before the Court of Appeals’ decision in Mankarious, Professor
Burrows had written approvingly of a similar result—measurement of the
constructive trust could be adjusted by granting the judge discretion to adjust
the amount of restitution in consideration of the defendant’s time and skill.
BURROWS, REMEDIES, supra note 111, at 620.
349. Attorney General for H.K. v. Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC) 330 (appeal
taken from NZCA) (UK).
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constructive trust begins. 350 In New Zealand, a constructive trust
commences under property concepts upon the defendant’s receipt
of the bribe in contrast to Australia, where the court has
equitable discretion to set the effective date according to policy
and context. 351
A court deciding the remedy for a commercial bribery should
have equitable discretion to decide that, if the defendant
deliberately breached her fiduciary duty by receiving a bribe and
made profits, the plaintiff may recover the defendant’s bribe and
her profits as a constructive trustee. 352 The court ought to
consider the defendant’s general creditors’ plight, real or
imagined. 353 Generalized concern that the constructive trust
overreaches the defendant’s general creditors should not be the
basis for a general rule against a constructive trust.
Like the Australian constructive trust, the constructive trust
in the United States is flexible, pragmatic, and remedial,
although with variations from state to state. 354 As the Reporter of
the Third Restatement of Restitution, Professor Andrew Kull
wrote:
[I]t is nothing less than extraordinary, to a U.S. lawyer, to
hear anyone . . . describe a constructive trust as a species of
trust. To us this seems just as old-fashioned, and just as
fundamentally misleading, as to describe a quasi-contractual
350. See Grimaldi [2012] 200 FCR at 422 (“Reid has the constructive trust
arising the moment the bribe is received. In Australia, the constructive trust in
this setting is a discretionary remedy.”).
351. Id.
352. See Graham Virgo, Whose Conscience? Unconscionability in the
Common Law of Obligations 35 (unpublished manuscript) (“Personal liability
for unjust enrichment can be converted into a proprietary claim by virtue of the
defendant’s subjective fault.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Mitchell, supra note 288, at 209–10 (discussing constructive trusts
under English law).
353. See Anthony Mason, The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the
Contemporary Common Law World, 110 L.Q. REV. 238, 253 (1994)
[T]he impact upon general creditors of proprietary relief and
equitable interests not registered as charges has been recognised as a
concern in other contexts as equity intrudes into the commercial
world via the Quistclose trust and the Romalpa clause and as the
substantive principles of equity and the common law converge.
354. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 55, 58 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (indicating that courts have discretion on
conditioning the surrender of the constructive trust property).
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obligation as a species of contract. Enlightenment on this
point came to U.S. lawyers over a century ago . . . . We see the
constructive trust as a remedy for certain cases . . . . We do not
spend any time worrying about the distinction between a
“remedial constructive trust” and some other [proprietary]
kind, because no U.S. lawyer has ever heard that there is any
other kind. 355

A United States judge should have the discretion and
flexibility to choose between a constructive trust and an
accounting-disgorgement in Beyer’s lawsuit against Aggie
according to the judge’s sense of where justice lies.
III. Civil Remedies: The Employer Sues the Briber
Suppose, for now, that Aggie is beyond the reach of Beyer’s
legal process. Or Aggie is obviously broke. When Beyer scans the
horizon for deep-pocket defendants, he spots Sailer. Sailer
facilitated Aggie’s violation of her fiduciary duty to Beyer.
Sailer’s bribe deprived Beyer of Aggie’s judgment and loyalty.
Sailer, the briber, is a wrongdoer even if Aggie had refused the
bribe. Sailer may be liable to Beyer.
First a detour. Suppose Aggie “suggested” to Sailer that her
home speakers were inadequate. She more than hinted that new
speakers would facilitate her decision to buy Sailer’s for Beyer.
Setting aside Sailer’s option to exit and, perhaps, to speak to the
authorities or to Beyer, Sailer, in short, may have been the victim
of Aggie’s “extortion.” If so, we think that Sailer escapes both
criminal liability 356 and civil liability. 357 In City of New York v.
Liberman, 358 the court wrote that although “the distinction
between bribe and extortion is a fine one,” it is an important line
for a court to draw. 359 The payer of a bribe is liable, but a victim
355. Andrew Kull, Deconstructing the Constructive Trust, 40 CAN. BUS. L.J.
358, 359 (2004).
356. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(6)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[A] person is
not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (a) he is a
victim of that offense.”). See generally NOONAN, supra note 12, at 638.
357. See Woods, supra note 199, at 956–57, 957 n.189 (describing the
analysis of New York v. Liberman, 232 A.D.2d 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)).
358. 232 A.D.2d 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
359. Id. at 44.
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of extortion is not liable for the payments that they were induced
to make. 360
A. The Briber’s Duty?
Sailer is not a fiduciary for Beyer. His “contract” with Aggie
is illegal and unenforceable. 361 What kind of legal duty did Sailer
breach? He may be a joint tortfeasor with Aggie. 362 Or he may
have committed the tort of inducing Aggie to breach her contract
with Beyer. 363
A New Jersey court took the employer’s search for a
defendant a step farther by finding a third party to a bribery
scheme liable as a joint tortfeasor. 364 A lawyer agreed to act as a
conduit for a bribery scheme involving a contractor and a public
official. 365 The lawyer retained a $96,000 fee from the contractor
for passing on a bribe for a city contract to the official. 366
360. See id. (“In the case of extortion, however, the one who is victimized by
an extortion will not be held civilly liable for the amount of such payments.”
(citation omitted)).
361. See Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the
Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504,
555 (1980) (examining restitution where party fails to fulfill illegal contract to
injure another); Commercial Bribery, supra note 36, at 801 (observing that
criminal statutes have been passed that declare the corrupt influencing of an
agent, servant, or employee to be a misdemeanor).
362. See Cont’l Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.2d 613, 619 (Ct. Cl. 1975)
(“[T]here is support for this result in views of the courts that have declared that
all knowing participants in a scheme involving an agent’s breach of duty may be
held jointly liable . . . .”); Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 160
S.W.2d 509, 514 (Tex. 1942) (“It is settled as the law of this State that where a
third party knowingly participates in the breach of a duty of a fiduciary, such
third party becomes a joint tortfeasor with the fiduciary and is liable as such.”).
363. Dorsett Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Whitt Tile & Marble Distrib. Co., 734
S.W.2d 322, 323–26 (Tenn. 1987); see DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111,
§ 10.6 n.4 (explaining that the briber who suborns the fiduciary is generally
guilty for the tort of inducing breach of contract). See Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 312 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 2006) for a discussion regarding other tort
approaches, including unfair competition and Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 876 (Am. Law Inst. 1977) for a discussion regarding aiding and abetting.
364. See Twp. of Wayne v. Messercola, 789 F. Supp. 1305, 1313 (D.N.J.
1992) (finding that the attorney “as an aider and abettor is liable”).
365. See id. at 1307 (describing that the attorney agreed to pass along the
bribe to Messercola relating to a real estate development project).
366. See id. (explaining that of the $273,000 received, the attorney kept
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Although the lawyer was neither the briber nor the rogue agent,
he was found jointly liable for the full amount of the bribe plus
the fee that he retained. 367
The employer may recover either proved compensatory
damages or restitution from Sailer, the briber. 368
B. Compensatory Damages
In Continental Management, Inc. v. United States, 369 the
Court of Claims held that the Government had a common law
damages action against a bank whose former president had
bribed federal employees to obtain mortgage insurance business
with the Government. 370 The bank had the temerity to sue the
Government to recover mortgage insurance. 371 The Government
counterclaimed to recover the bribes. 372 Because the Government
was unable to prove specific pecuniary damages, we assume that
the company had performed the contracts satisfactorily and for
the same consideration the Government would have had to pay
anyway. 373
The court articulated its reasoning to support the
Government’s recovery of compensatory damages:
$96,000 for himself).
367. See id. at 1311 (“[S]o long as double recovery is not awarded for the
bribes, the aider and abettor who is a joint tortfeasor with the agent is jointly
liable to the principal for the agent’s secret profits.” (citation omitted)).
368. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.
1958) (explaining that a person who intentionally causes the violation of a duty
to a principal is subject to liability either in tort or in restitution); DOBBS, LAW
OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 10.6 (“From a briber, the victimized employer
may recover either (1) proven damages or (2) restitution.”).
369. 527 F.2d 613 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
370. See id. at 621 (“We hold, therefore, that the bribery for which plaintiffs
are responsible was a wrong against the defendant . . . .”).
371. See id. at 614 (describing the suit against the United States for sums
allegedly due to them under contracts of mortgage insurance issued by the
Federal Housing Administration).
372. See id. (“Only the first counterclaim, in which the Government seeks to
collect from plaintiffs an amount equal to the sum of bribes paid . . . is before
the court at this time on the parties’ cross-motions.”).
373. See id. at 615 (“Government has shown only that such unlawful
payments were made and has not proved direct or specific monetary injury.”).
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It is an old maxim of the law that, where the fact of injury is
adequately shown, the court should not cavil at the absence of
specific or detailed proof of the damages. Here, the plaintiffs
engaged in wrongful conduct that clearly hurt the
Government. Significant elements of that harm, such as the
injury to the impartial administration of governmental
programs, are not susceptible to an accurate monetary gauge.
We should not deny the Government relief because Sirote
managed to cause injury not readily traceable or measurable.
Similarly, the Government’s inability to attach an exact and
provable dollar figure to the harm it sustained should not
result in the effective exculpation of the plaintiffs. . . . As
between the briber and the bribee’s employer, the risks of
damage determination should fall on the former. 374

But how will the court measure those compensatory
damages? It continued:
On this premise the amount of the bribe provides a reasonable
measure of damage, in the absence of a more precise
yardstick. That is, after all, the value the plaintiffs placed on
their corruption of the defendant’s employees; the other side of
the coin is that the [bribers] hoped and expected to benefit by
more than the sum of the bribes. It is therefore fair to use that
total as the measure of an injury which is probable in its
impact but uncertain in its mathematical calculation. . . . Of
course, the Government cannot recover the bribes twice—once
from the briber and again from the corrupted employee. But it
is entitled to one such recovery. 375

In measuring the Government’s compensatory damages, are
we willing to accept this much imprecision about its loss or
injury? The court set recovery at the amount of the bribe, which,
as the court said, is the value the wrongdoers gave. 376 If the
374. Id. at 619.
375. Id. (citations omitted); see also Franklin Med. Assocs. v. Newark Pub.
Sch., 828 A.2d 966, 974–80 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (finding that the
victim of a bribe by its agent may recover damages from an aider and abettor of
a bribery scheme measured by the amount of the bribe without demonstrating
actual loss); Jaclyn, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 406 A.2d 474, 492 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (explaining that the bribed agent’s principal
recovered the amount of the bribe from the briber, trebled under state RICO
statute, plus the plaintiff's attorney fee, because the briber deprived the
principal of the value of the agent’s services and the bribe is the price put on it).
376. See Cont’l Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.2d 613, 619 (Ct. Cl. 1975)
(explaining the premise that the amount of bribe provides a reasonable way to
measure damage).
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briber was efficiency-minded, it expected to gain more than the
amount of the bribe. But the defendant’s gain or unjust
enrichment measures restitution, not compensatory damages.
Even though Beyer’s injury is not palpably clear, deterrence of
Sailer and other intentional wrongdoers seems to be a valid
policy.
Perhaps the Continental Management court’s view of the
Government’s remedy as compensatory damages clouded a focus
on restitution. We turn to the employer’s restitution.
C. Unjust Enrichment, Restitution, and Disgorgement
Sailer obtained something from Beyer: Aggie’s loyalty and an
economic advantage. Beyer’s restitution from Sailer may take one
of two forms: rescission-restitution and plain-vanilla restitution.
Aggie, as Beyer’s agent, had actual authority to buy the
speakers. Can Beyer, her principal, extricate himself from the
transaction? Yes, he may rescind his bribe-induced contract with
Sailer. 377
Suppose Sailer has delivered the speakers to Beyer and
Beyer has paid Sailer when he discovers that Sailer bribed Aggie.
Beyer can rescind his contract with Sailer because of Sailer’s
fraud and receive a refund—restitution of his consideration. But
in usual rescission-restitution law, Beyer should make
restitution—return the speakers. 378 On first blush, there is a
377. See Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Minn. 1952) (discussing a
principal’s ability to seek damages after rescinding a transaction subject to a
bribe); Jaclyn, 406 A.2d at 484 n.7 (noting that, in private contracts, a person
who discovers he has been defrauded has the option to ratify or rescind the
contract); Black v. MTV Networks Inc. 576 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991) (allowing MTV to terminate an agreement with Black who “secretly made
gifts totaling thousands of dollars to MTV’s director of personnel and . . . made
an interest-free loan of $30,000 to another MTV employee”); Am. Assurance
Underwriters Grp. v. Metlife Gen. Ins. Agency, 552 N.Y.S.2d 259, 260 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990) (allowing MetLife to terminate an agreement with AAUG who
made “secret stock payments to MetLife’s employees”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. e, illus. 9, 10 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“A principal may avoid a
contract entered into by the agent with a third party who participated in the
agent's breach of duty.”). See generally Smith, Fiduciary Relationships, supra
note 70; Commercial Bribery, supra note 36; Commercial Bribery: The Need for
Legislation in Minnesota, supra note 36.
378. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 54(2)
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striking difference between this result, and a partially executed
contract where the speakers are delivered but Beyer has not
paid; Beyer may receive the speakers without paying.
The court could resolve the difference by refusing restitution
to Sailer because of his unclean hands—inequitable conduct. 379
Another possible solution is for the court to focus on Beyer’s
enrichment and utilize discretion in measurement to set an
amount that Beyer should pay Sailer.
Suppose that after Sailer delivers the speakers to Beyer,
Beyer learns about the bribe. Unpaid, Sailer sues Beyer for the
price. The court should deny Sailer recovery on the ground that
the “agreement” was tainted by the bribe and illegal in violation
of public policy. Denial of recovery to a bribe-payer is
straightforward—at least in government work. All the
bribe-paying plaintiff’s claims on the contract are forfeited,
because the bribe is “fraud,” which triggers “nonenforcement” on
public policy grounds. 380 The court, however, may allow Beyer to
keep the speakers without paying anyone anything for them.
Does that go too far?
In Jaclyn, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 381 agents of a
handbag manufacturer frequently bribed employees of a retail
company. 382 Although the retailer found out about the bribes its
employees were receiving, it continued to purchase merchandise
from the manufacturer without addressing the bribes. 383
Eventually the retailer defaulted on payments for the
(AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“Rescission requires a mutual restoration and accounting
in which each party (a) restores property received from the other, to the extent
such restoration is feasible . . . .”).
379. See id. § 63 (“Recovery in restitution to which an innocent claimant
would be entitled may be limited or denied because of the claimant’s inequitable
conduct in the transaction that is the source of the asserted liability.”).
380. See Supermex, Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 29, 40–42 (1996)
(explaining that only through the remedy of non-enforcement can the
procurement system free itself of the suspicion of undetected frauds); DOBBS,
LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 10.6 nn.6–7 (“[I]f the briber has sold goods
to the victimized employer as a result of illegality, he cannot recover for their
value; that is, his bribery is a defense to the claim.”).
381. 406 A.2d 474 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
382. Id. at 477 (relating the facts of the case).
383. See id. at 478 (explaining that Edison acquired reliable knowledge in
early 1976 that Jaclyn was making pay-offs to purchasing agents).
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merchandise. 384 The manufacturer sued for the amount that was
left unpaid for its merchandise, but the retailer offered the
affirmative defense of commercial bribery under a New Jersey
statute and counterclaimed for the amount of the bribe. 385 The
court found that the affirmative defense of commercial bribery
failed because the buyer knew about the bribery scheme and
continued to let its agents purchase from the manufacturer. 386
However, the court found the manufacturer liable for the amount
of the bribe, despite the prior knowledge of the buyer. 387
If Sailer sues Beyer for the price and Beyer counterclaims,
should the court, in addition to refusing to grant Sailer recovery,
force Sailer to refund Beyer’s earlier payments for the speakers?
Beyer may argue that, because the transaction was tainted by
the bribe, it was illegal in violation of public policy. In an
official-bribery decision in S.T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New York, 388
the New York Court of Appeals went a little farther. The firm
that had bribed a city employee sued the City for the balance
“due” on the tainted contract. 389 The court, turning the tables,
held that the City could recover all of the amounts it had paid the
briber under the bribe-induced contract. 390
Should the court, in addition, force Sailer to refund Beyer’s
earlier payments for the speakers? Following S.T. Grand above
into a private bribery, an unpaid Sailer cannot recover the price
and, perhaps, must return Buyer’s earlier payments. If so, the
384. See id. at 480–81 (describing a “clearance policy” in which no invoices
would be paid or normal business resumed until the vendor “told the truth”
regarding payments to buyers).
385. See id. at 483 (“Edison urges this court to hold that one who resorts to
the acts employed by Jaclyn should be denied the right of recovering the agreed
price of the goods sold and delivered, notwithstanding that the merchandise
was retained by Edison and retailed at a profit.”).
386. See id. at 484 (indicating that a contract to do an illegal act or one
made in the violation of a penal statute is void and unenforceable).
387. Id. at 491.
388. 298 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1973).
389. See id. at 106 (stating that the city was being sued for an unpaid
balance due on the cleaning contract).
390. See id. at 108 (explaining that a municipality may recover from the
vendor all amounts paid under an illegal contract in an effort to deter violation
of the bidding statutes); see also Woods, supra note 199, at 931–33 (indicating
that the described scandal effectively created a legal doctrine that is viewed as a
deterrent to corruption).
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court has allowed Beyer to keep the speakers without paying
anyone anything for them. Does this go too far?
The employer may recover the amount of the bribe from the
briber as plain restitution. 391 Courts have described this recovery
of restitution as legal restitution of the money had and
received. 392 Two decisions distort or “relax” tracing to find that
the briber was constructive trustee for the amount it had paid
plaintiff’s agent. 393
If Sailer was successful, was he enriched? Unjustly? By the
value of his sales and profits? 394 Should a court award Beyer
restitution from Sailer measured by the amount of the bribe? 395
The amount of Sailor’s gross profit on the speakers? Both?
Perhaps the larger of the two. 396
The bribing seller’s unjust enrichment does not match the
amount of the bribe. 397 And the seller, having paid the bribe to
391. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Am. Plumbing & Supply Co., 19 F.R.D.
334, 345 (E.D. Wis. 1956) (defendant was constructive trustee for the amount it
had paid plaintiff’s agent); Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Schell, 238 Ill. App. 560,
565 (Ill. App. Ct. 1925) (same); see also In re Browning’s Estate, 30 N.Y.S.2d
604, 605 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1941) (“The vendor has had and received money which
belongs to the purchaser to the extent of the bribe, which neither the vendor nor
the unfaithful agent may in conscience and good morals retain.”). See generally
Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 160 S.W.2d 509, 514 (Tex. 1942);
PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 8.6 n.43.
392. See United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 317 (1910) (indicating that a
judgment was rendered for “money had and received for its use”). See generally
Mahesan v. Malay. Hous. Soc’y, [1979] A.C. 374 (PC) (appeal taken from Fed.
Ct. Malay.)).
393. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Am. Plumbing & Supply Co., 19 F.R.D.
334, 346 (E.D. Wis. 1956) (“The Court being of the opinion that it is a situation
where constructive trust has been established . . . the action is of equitable
nature.”); Cen. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v Schell, 238 Ill. App. 560, 564 (Ill. App. Ct.
1925) (“In such case, equity will impress a constructive trust upon the money in
his hands.”).
394. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 51 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
395. See PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 8.5 n.10
(“Whether paid or not there is also authority granting restitution to the
principal from the defendant who paid or agreed to pay the commission, on the
theory that the purchase price to the principal was increased by the amount of
the commission or bribe.”).
396. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 cmt. d (AM. LAW
INST. 1958).
397. See James M. Fischer, The Puzzle of the Actual Injury Requirement for
Damages, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 197, 233–34, 233 n.142 (2008) (demonstrating
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the agent, does not retain the bribe. “There is less doctrinal
strain,” Professor Palmer observed, “if the [employer’s] recovery
[from the seller of the amount of the bribe] is regarded as
damages.” 398 Professor Peter Birks also questioned the
theoretical base of restitution to recover the amount of the bribe
from the briber: the bribe “is apparently not money received but
money laid out.” 399 Dobbs wrote that “the amount of the bribe
becomes surrogate for the actual benefits received by the briber
when those benefits cannot be identified.” 400
Suppose the briber gained more than the amount of the
bribe. The defendant’s unjust enrichment, if it exceeds the bribed
agent’s principal’s loss, measures the principal’s recovery.
Bribery leads to restitution, the briber’s disgorgement of all
profits. 401
In Williams Electronics Games v. Garrity, 402 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the employerprincipal may recover from the briber of his employee. 403 Its
recovery is measured by either its damages or the briber’s profits
(restitution), 404 whichever is larger. The damages formula is the
bribe plus revenue from the bribe minus the defendant’s
legitimate costs. 405
In a 2006 New Jersey decision, the defendant-Bank’s
employee had bribed a public official to obtain the
the difficulty in establishing an action for unjust enrichment against a briber
because tying the benefit to the briber may be difficult).
398. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.11 n.22.
399. BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 129, at 338.
400. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, §10.6.
401. See Cty. of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 848, 855 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007) (“[T]he evidence and law support the trial court and warrant a
damage award based on disgorgement of the amounts by which [the defendants]
were unjustly enriched.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 44 illus. 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (noting that “Buyer is entitled to
recover $5000 from Seller” when Seller bribes Buyer with $5000 because “it
may be presumed . . . that Seller has derived a benefit of at least $5000 from the
illegal transaction”).
402. 366 F.3d 569, 579 (7th Cir. 2004)
403. See id. at 579 (reversing the lower court’s rejection of an employer’s
claim).
404. See id. at 576 (noting the damages remedy and restitution remedy are
both available to bribery victims).
405. See id. (calculating a briber’s total profits).
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plaintiff-County’s bond business. 406 The dispute had been
through criminal prosecutions and the SEC before the County’s
civil action against the Bank was tried. Although the Bank had
already paid the County the amount of the kickbacks,
$206,809.22, the County sued the Bank to recover its unjust
enrichment. 407 The County sought disgorgement of the Bank’s
“underwriter’s discount.” 408 After a complex submission that
included several other substantive theories, the jury’s verdict for
the County was for unjust enrichment-disgorgement. 409
The New Jersey Supreme Court hinged its decision on
restitution of the defendant’s unjust enrichment, not the
plaintiff’s loss. 410 The Bank’s disgorgement, the court said, is “not
related to whether the County suffered damages.” 411 The court
turned to measurement of restitution. 412 The County could
recover the Bank’s gross profits, the “total fees received [and
retained] by the bank.” 413 Finally, prejudgment interest ran from
the date of the improper transaction, not the date of the
plaintiff’s complaint. 414 The remedy was full disgorgement, by
which means the court intended to deter future bribes. 415

406. See generally Cty. of Essex v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 891 A.2d 600,
602 (N.J. 2006).
407. Id. at 602.
408. See id. at 603 (“In the aggregate, the Bank received underwriting fees
of $2,883,019.15.”).
409. See id. (‘The jury returned a verdict in favorof the County for its unjust
enrichment/disgorgement claim . . . in the amount of $ 600,000.”).
410. See id. at 607 (highlighting restitution).
411. Id. at 607.
412. See id. at 608–09 (assessing the amount the Bank should disgorge to
the County).
413. Id. at 604.
414. See id. at 609 ( calculating the interest based on the date of the bribe).
415. See id. at 607 (“Strong remedies are necessary to combat unlawful
conduct involving public officials. Disgorgement in favor of the public entity
serves as a harsh remedy against those who bribe a public official to secure a
public contract and provides a deterrent to such unlawful activity.”). See
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 44
illus. 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
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IV. Loose Ends
We have not considered the legal relations between Sailer
and Aggie and the way the bribe affects third parties.
After bribing Aggie, suppose Sailer gets cold feet and
changes his mind about selling speakers to Beyer. Sailer sues
Aggie for restitution. Even though keeping the speakers leaves
Aggie unjustly enriched, a court will be likely to cite Sailer’s
inequitable conduct or unclean hands and refuse to grant him a
refund. 416 Sailer cannot recover the bribe because the court will
conclude that his misconduct has forfeited his claim to recover
it. 417
The other side of that coin supposes that Aggie buys Sailer’s
speakers for Beyer’s inventory. Aggie, the agent who has not
received the bribe, cannot enforce the briber’s illegal promise to
pay it. 418
Is there honor among thieves? The cynical “advice” to a
bribe-giver and his taker is to leave nothing executory, to
exchange consideration simultaneously.
Because of Sailer’s bribe to Aggie, Sailer’s competitors did
not sell their speakers to Beyer. Sailer may be liable to a
competitor for interference with its prospective advantage. 419
Beyond the seller’s competitors, we have run out of plaintiffs.
Taxpayer-citizens lack “standing” to sue a crooked official for
416. See Womack v. Maner, 301 S.W.2d 438, 439 (Ark. 1957) (affirming the
defendant’s demurrer when the plaintiff sued to recover bribes paid to the
defendant). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT §§ 32(3) illus. 12, note, 63 (AM. LAW INST. 2011); PALMER, THE LAW
OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 3.6.
417. See Attorney Gen. for H.K. v. Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC) 330 [2] (appeal
taken from NZCA) (UK) (“The provider of a bribe cannot recover it because he
committed a criminal offence when he paid the bribe.”).
418. See Oscanyon v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 267 (1880) (“The court will not
listen to claims founded upon services rendered in violation of common decency,
public morality, or the law.”); Wolfe v. Int’l Reinsurance Corp., 73 F.2d 267, 269
(2d Cir. 1934) (L. Hand, J.) (denying recovery for services rendered when the
principals involved had conflicting relations); see also PALMER, THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 8.5 (noting that in “nearly all authority,” an agent
cannot recover a commission where there is illegality on the part of both
parties). See generally Gray v. Pankey, 100 So. 880, 881 (Ala. 1924); Friedmann,
supra note 361, at 555–56; Commercial Bribery, supra note 36, at 801.
419. See generally DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 10.6.
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equitable restitution of his bribe. 420 In Fuchs v. Bidwill, 421 an
Illinois court held that citizens, residents, and taxpayers lacked
standing to sue on behalf of the state for equitable restitution of
corrupt profits allegedly earned by state legislators. 422 The State
Attorney General, the majority held, was the real party in
interest who could have sued, but individual citizens and
taxpayers could not. 423
V. Double Recovery, Punitive Damages, and Multiple Damages
To examine the risk of excess and the need for principles of
confinement we take up double recovery, punitive damages, and
multiple damages.
A. Employer Sues Both the Briber and the Employee
Suppose Aggie is back. May Beyer recover the amount of the
bribe twice, from both Aggie—the bribe recipient—and Sailer—
the bribe payer?
Beyer may sue both Aggie and Sailer as joint tortfeasors.
Usually each joint tortfeasor is responsible for all of the plaintiff’s
damages. 424 A plaintiff may be successful against more than one
defendant under more than one substantive theory, but that
plaintiff should recover only once—a single satisfaction. 425 A
420. See Fuchs v. Bidwill, 359 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ill. 1976) (stating that the
public interest would not benefit from allowing private citizens to bring such
suits).
421. 359 N.E.2d 158 (Ill. 1976).
422. Id. at 162.
423. Id. Justice Schaefer wrote a strong dissent. Id. at 162–65 (Schaefer, J.
dissenting). But see ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.100 (West 2016) (permitting Alaska
voters to bring suits to enforce certain statutes concerning public finances);
Mackey v. McDonald, 504 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Ark. 1974) (permitting a citizen suit
concerning misappropriation of public money).
424. See DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 100, § 488. (“When two
or more tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, each defendant is subject to
liability for all of the plaintiff’s damages.”).
425. See id. § 487 (“If joint and several liability applies, each defendant will
be liable to the plaintiff . . . subject to the caveat that the plaintiff can only
receive one satisfaction of the judgement.”).
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plaintiff may not recover the same element of compensatory
damages from two defendants. 426 The plaintiff is entitled to
recover only once. 427
Suppose Beyer sues Sailer alone first and recovers the
amount of the bribe. Considering the reasons to compel a
bribe-taker to disgorge, should the court limit the plaintiff to that
one recovery? Two of our courts say “Yes.” 428 However, forbidding
the plaintiff from recovering the amount of the bribe twice, from
the briber and the bribee, may erode the idea that the breaching
fiduciary must surrender the fruits of her breach even though the
principal lost nothing. If Beyer sues Sailer first, recovers, and
second sues Aggie, then the policy tension is between eschewing
Beyer’s double recovery of the bribe, on the one hand, and on the
other, deterring bribes and preventing Aggie’s unjust
enrichment.
If Beyer sues Aggie first, Beyer’s recovery from her may
leave nothing for Sailer to pay later. This may erode the policy of
deterring bribes. 429 We see no possibility for Aggie to pay Beyer
and then recover indemnity from Sailer. 430 We turn to the
Tennessee court for some enlightenment.
In litigation involving an employer’s claims against a bribing
seller and an employee who had received kickbacks, the trial
judge had entered judgment against the seller for the tort of
procuring breach of contract. 431 The court measured the
employer’s recovery by the amount of the employee’s salary
426. See id. § 479 (discussing the basic elements and limitations on
compensatory damage calculations).
427. See United States v. Project on Gov’t Oversight, 572 F. Supp. 2d 73, 77
(D.D.C. 2008) (declining “to award . . . another judgment against [the
defendant] in the same amount arising out of the same conduct”); Twp. of
Wayne v. Messercola, 789 F. Supp. 1305, 1311–12 (D.N.J. 1992) (finding that
the plaintiff could only recover once for bribery). See generally DOBBS ET AL., THE
LAW OF TORTS, supra note 100, § 488.
428. See Cont’l Mgmt, Inc. v. United States, 527 F.2d 613, 619 (Ct. Cl. 1975)
(noting that a plaintiff “cannot recover the bribes twice”); Dorsett Carpet Mills,
Inc. v. Whitt Tile & Marble Distrib. Co., 734 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tenn. 1987).
429. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (stating that restitution
may serve as a deterrent to future acts of bribery).
430. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 23 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
431. Dorsett Carpet Mills, 734 S.W.2d at 323.
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“during the period of his duplicitous conduct.” 432 “The trial court
also rendered a judgment against both [the bribing seller and the
corrupt employee] for the amount of secret commissions.” 433 The
seller appealed. 434
The Tennessee Supreme Court thought the employee’s salary
was an appropriate recovery for the employer against the
employee. 435 But the employee’s salary was, the court said, “an
inappropriate element of damage to charge against the procurer
of the breach.” 436 The secret kickbacks that the seller had paid
the employee were the employer’s proper recovery against that
defendant. The court articulated this recovery as compensatory
damages for the employer’s loss: “[H]ad [the bribing seller] not
paid this money to [plaintiff’s employee], it may be presumed
that these funds would have inured to the benefit of [the
employer] in the form of lower prices or greater commissions.” 437
The court also approved trebled recovery under a Tennessee
statute that forbids inducing breach of contract. 438
The employer, Birks wrote, “can have either restitution or
compensation, and whichever he chooses he cannot have it from
both briber and bribee.” 439 However, the court’s focus on tort
damages might lead it to neglect the other policies of deterrence
and preventing unjust enrichment. Considering deterrence of
both payers and receivers of bribes, should the court limit the
plaintiff to one recovery? If not, how much should the recovery
be? And how should the court measure it? The Tennessee court
said that the employer may recover the employee’s salary from
the employee and the briber’s bribe from it—but not the
employee’s salary from the briber. 440

432. Id. at 325.
433. Id. at 323–24.
434. Id. at 324.
435. Id. at 325.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 326.
438. See id. (trebling the damages according to a state statute).
439. BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 129, at 338.
440. Dorsett Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Whitt Tile & Marble Distrib. Co., 734
S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tenn. 1987).
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The Tennessee court quoted the Restatement of Torts: “any
damages in fact paid by the third person will reduce the damages
actually recoverable” for interference with contract. 441
The question of whether the employer could collect
judgments from both the seller and the employee without
receiving duplicated recovery was not, however, raised. 442 The
Tennessee court’s quotation from the Torts Restatement probably
meant that the court thought that the agent’s re-payment of her
salary to her principal will reduce the amount the briber owes
the principal.
If, on the other hand, the court measures restitution by the
amount of the defendants’ unjust enrichment, rather than the
plaintiff’s loss, then it may allow the employer to recover from
both the briber and the bribee even though, as restitution often
does, it exceeds compensatory damages. 443 Citing decisions that
go both ways, Dobbs wrote, “[suppose] the employer first recovers
damages (not restitution) from the briber, then seeks restitution
from the employee. . . . [T]he second recovery appears desirable to
force the disloyal employee to disgorge his unjust gain.” 444
Reporters’ notes from two Restatements, Agency Third, and
Restitution Third, show the policy conflicts and difficulty in
combining compensatory damages and restitution with recovery
from both the giver and the receiver of a bribe. 445
The Restatement of Agency begins by saying that the
employer may not recover the bribe twice, once from employee
and once from briber. 446 But it continues: “If a principal recovers
damages from a third party as a consequence of an agent’s breach
441. Id. at 325 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A(2) (AM.
LAW INST. 1979)).
442. See id.
443. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 44 rep. note b (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“[W]here the goal of the remedy is
accordingly disgorgement rather than compensation, courts have allowed the
victim to recover the amount of the bribe twice—once from the bribe-giver and
once from the faithless agent.”).
444. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 10.6.
445. See infra notes 446–450 and accompanying text (describing the policies
that inform damages and restitution).
446. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 rep. note e (AM. LAW INST.
2006) (citing Franklin Med. Assocs. v. Newark Pub. Schs., 828 A.2d 966, 976
(N.J. Super. App. Div. 2003)).

442

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 369 (2017)

of fiduciary duty, the principal remains entitled to recover from
the agent any benefit that the agent improperly received from the
transaction.” 447 Beyer, it seems, may recover damages from
Sailer and the bribe from Aggie. 448
The Restatement of Restitution’s Illustration states: “if a
double recovery . . . would constitute an inappropriate windfall,
Buyer’s recovery from Seller may be reduced by the amount of
any recovery that Buyer obtains from Agent . . . .” 449 No double
recovery from both Sailer and Aggie? The Reporter’s Note on the
Illustration continues:
The analytical choice between presumed benefit to the bribegiver (justifying a recovery in restitution) and presumed loss
to the victim (justifying an award of damages in tort) may
appear somewhat arbitrary. In a commercial bribery case
where the theory of recovery is indeed unjust enrichment
rather than injury, and where the goal of the remedy is
accordingly disgorgement rather than compensation, courts
have allowed the victim to recover the amount of the bribe
twice—once from the bribe-giver and once from the faithless
agent. (The rules of the present Topic consistently allow
restitution from a conscious wrongdoer in an amount
exceeding the claimant’s loss.) By contrast, the possibility of a
double recovery will be properly rejected by a court that sees
the remedy in a bribery case as an award of damages for
tort. 450

The principle against unjust enrichment, it seems, overcomes
duplication and windfall to support Beyer’s recovery of the
amount of the bribe from both Sailer and Aggie. An observer may
inquire whether this goes too far.
B. Punitive Damages
What about punitive damages for bribery? When we consider
common law punitive damages, we put the policies of
compensation and preventing unjust enrichment behind us. The
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
illus. 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
450. Id. § 44 rep. note b.

OF

RESTITUTION
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uniform purposes of taking punitive damages from the defendant
are to punish that defendant and to deter future misconduct,
hers and others. 451 The policies that support awarding the
punitive damages to the plaintiff are to pay the plaintiff a bounty
for bringing a wrongdoer to book, to finance the plaintiff’s
litigation as a surrogate for attorney fee recovery, and to provide
the plaintiff a peaceful substitute for private vengeance. 452
The defendants’ misconduct may be sufficiently aggravated
to qualify the plaintiff for punitive damages under the
jurisdiction’s misconduct threshold, which may be either actual
malice, implied malice, conscious reckless disregard, or gross
negligence. 453 Punitive damages may be available in addition to
compensatory damages or restitution. 454
A court may analyze an employee’s breach of fiduciary duty
to her employer as a tort that qualifies the employer to recover
punitive damages. Courts have approved punitive damages in
bribery and breach of fiduciary duty cases. 455 The Restitution,
Employment, and Agency Restatements allow the employer of a
451. See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Me. 1985) (“[A]
substantial majority of jurisdictions today allow common law punitive
damages . . . for the purpose of deterrence or punishment or both.”); Jaclyn, Inc.
v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 406 A.2d 474, 492 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979)
(“[Punitive damages] are awarded upon a theory of punishment to the offender
for aggravated misconduct and to deter such conduct in the future.” (quoting
Leimgruber v. Claridge Associates, Ltd., 73 N.J. 450, 375 A.2d 652, 654 (1977))).
452. See Doug Rendleman, Common Law Punitive Damages: Something for
Everyone?, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1, 18 (2009) [hereinafter Rendleman, Common
Law Punitive Damages] (discussing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471
(2008)); Dorsey D. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive
Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982) (discussing the theories underlying
punitive damages).
453. See generally RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 149–51; Jaclyn,
Inc., 406 A.2d at 492.
454. See Jaclyn, 406 A.2d at 494 (adding punitive damages to compensatory
damages).
455. See Cty. of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 848, 855 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007) (calculating recovery for bribed public official as the disgorgement of
all profits plus punitive damages); Hensley v. Tri–QSI Denver Corp., 98 P.3d
965, 968 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that punitive damages are not “strictly
limited to the amount of actual damages” awarded); Jaclyn, 406 A.2d at 492–94
(permitting the recovery of punitive damages from a briber); Banks v. Mario
Indus. of Va., Inc., 650 S.E.2d 687, 699 (Va. 2007) (outlining the non-bribe
fiduciary duty and awarding punitive damages because of defendants’ “sinister
or corrupt motive”).
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bribed employee to recover compensatory damages and
restitution, plus punitive damages. 456
The Restatement of Restitution explains the combination of
restitution with punitive damages:
Disgorgement of wrongful gain is not a punitive
remedy. . . . The rationale of punitive or exemplary damages is
independent of the law of unjust enrichment. The rules that
govern such damages are part of the tort law of a given
jurisdiction, . . . . If the defendant’s conduct meets the
applicable standard for additional liability, there is no
intrinsic inconsistency in a judgment that reinforces
disgorgement of wrongful gain with an explicitly punitive
award. 457

Characterization of bribery as breach of contract militates
against the plaintiff’s recovery of punitive damages unless the
defendant also committed an independent tort. 458 That tort may
be fiduciary breach. In Hensley v. Tri–QSI Denver Corp., 459 the
employer-plaintiff recovered $131,109 for breach of contract,
which was large, and $5,451 for breach of fiduciary duty, which
was small. 460 But the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to
punitive damages under the Colorado statute based only on the
fiduciary tort. 461
456. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 51 cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (noting that courts “will sometimes
supplement the defendant's liability in restitution with an award of exemplary
damages”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(b) (AM. LAW INST.
2015) (permitting punitive damages in addition to losses for an employee’s
breach of tort-based or fiduciary duty); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 8.01
cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“A breach of fiduciary duty may also subject the
agent to liability for punitive damages when the circumstances satisfy generally
applicable standards for their imposition.”); see also Smith, Fiduciary
Relationships, supra note 70, at 622 (“In some jurisdictions, fiduciaries may be
subject to punitive damages.”).
457. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51
cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
458. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(b) (AM. LAW INST.
2015) (permitting punitive damages for breaches of tort based duties or
fiduciary duties).
459. 98 P.3d 965 (Colo. Ct. App 2004).
460. See id. at 966 (“The company was awarded $131,109.52 on its breach of
contract claim and $5,451.39 on its breach of fiduciary duty claim . . . .”).
461. See id. at 968 (“No amount of punitive damages could have been
recovered by the company on its contract breach claim; its breach of fiduciary
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In Kann v. Kann, 462 however, the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that “there is no universal or omnibus tort for the redress of
breach of fiduciary duty by any and all fiduciaries.” 463 The
decision affects the litigants’ right to a jury trial and the winner’s
opportunity to recover punitive damages. Is the Maryland court’s
view—rejecting an independent tort of fiduciary breach and
punitive damages—an unnecessary limitation or a salutary
principle of confinement?
C. Multiplied Recovery
The bait of increased recovery leads commercial bribery
plaintiffs to sue under multiple-damages statutes. In Rhode
Island, the plaintiff need not search far because the commercial
bribery statute provides for double damages. 464 Examples of
multiple damages statutes in commercial bribery follow.
In Kewaunee Science Corporation v. Pegram, 465 Kewaunee,
the former employer, sued both its former purchasing agent and
several sellers who had bribed its purchasing agent. 466 The court
accepted the plaintiff’s argument “that they should not have to
prove out of pocket loss due to the transaction.” 467 “[C]ommercial
bribery,” the court said, “harms an employer as a matter of law,
and the proper measure of damages suffered must include at a
minimum the amount of the commercial bribes the third party
paid.” 468 Moreover, defendants’ bribery qualified the plaintiff for
treble “damages” because it is considered misconduct under the
North Carolina unfair and deceptive trade practices act. 469

duty claim was the only tort claim that was presented for resolution.”).
462. 690 A.2d 509 (Md. 1997).
463. Id. at 521.
464. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-7-6 (1956) (establishing double damages in civil
liability for bribery).
465. 503 S.E.2d 417 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
466. Id. at 419 (describing a suit to recover damages resulting from a
bribery).
467. Id.
468. Id. at 419–20.
469. See id. at 420 (trebling damages under North Carolina law).
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In Franklin Medical Associates v. Newark Public Schools, 470
a New Jersey court trebled the amount of the bribe under the
state RICO statute and added the plaintiff’s attorney fee. 471 The
Tennessee court trebled the bribed employee’s employer’s
compensatory damages under a statute that forbids inducing
breach of contract. 472 In Killough, the False Claims Act called for
statutory penalties plus doubled damages. 473
A trebled RICO damages judgment is also a variation on
punitive damages. 474 “Bribery of a government official . . . can
serve as a predicate [offense] for a RICO violation.” 475 In MDO
Development Corporation v. Kelly, 476 an employer sued an
embezzling employee under the federal Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. 477 In addition to rejecting the
defendant’s claim for wages, the court imposed a constructive
trust on a house that the defendant had purchased with the
bezzle. 478 It trebled the RICO damages judgment. 479
If the court’s policy of restitution is to deter future
misconduct, can there be too much of a good thing? In MDO
Development, is the constructive trust, trebling, and denial of

470. 828 A.2d 966 (Super. Ct. N.J. App. Div. 2003)
471. See id. at 974–80 (allowing treble damages and attorney's fees).
472. See Dorsett Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Whitt Tile & Marble Distrib. Co., 734
S.W.2d 322, 323–26 (Tenn. 1987) (allowing trebled damages).
473. See United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1532 (11th Cir. 1988)
(affirming doubled damages under the FCA); supra note 189 and accompanying
text (relating the facts in Killough). Congress amended the statute to treble the
damages in 1986. See Killough, 848 F.2d at 1532 n.4. This action was filed in
1985. Id. at 1526. The Government did not seek trebled damages reflecting that
change. Id. at 1532 n.4.
474. See MDO Dev. Corp. v. Kelly, 726 F. Supp. 79, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(declining “to assess punitive damages . . . because the imposition of treble
damages . . . is already sufficient punishment”).
475. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Johnston, 763 F.3d 723, 729 (7th Cir.
2014).
476. 726 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
477. Id. at 81. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1961–63 (2012) (establishing treble
damages, the bribe, plus a “reasonable” attorney fee § 1964(c), or a constructive
trust).
478. See MDO Dev. Corp., 726 F. Supp. at 85 (imposing a constructive
trust).
479. See id. at 86 (trebling damages).
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reimbursement 480 an excessive recovery, a “windfall” to the
plaintiff?
Courts have awarded our commercial bribery plaintiffs
common law punitive damages and multiple recovery under an
unfair trade practices act, federal and state RICO statutes, the
federal False Claims Act, and a statute for interference with
contract. 481 The obscurity and fuzziness this paper has observed
in choice and measurement of remedies continues in multiple
damages and their cousin, statutory penalties.
A court applying a statute does not go through the common
law reasoning process of examining policy justification, rule, and
result that leads to creating the law as it applies the statute. The
court will apply an unambiguous statute as it is written. 482
The policies of multiple recovery are not easy to pin down.
Legislatures have passed many multiple statutes with policies
that vary from one state to another. A researcher found every
policy this paper discusses in courts’ decisions discussing
multiple, statutory, and “liquidated” recoveries.
Although multiplying occurs under a statute that caps
plaintiff’s recovery, courts cite statutory multiple damages to
justify and explain non-statutory common law punitive
damages. 483 Although a careful researcher did not find a direct
citation, “enhanced”—that is, trebled—damages for a defendant’s
“willful” patent infringement are, in everything but name,

480. See id. at 85–86 (imposing a constructive trust and treble damages, and
dismissing claims for reimbursement).
481. See generally supra notes 466–475 and accompanying text.
482. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 3.12 (describing the
nature of multiple damages statutes and how courts have construed them).
483. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 490–515 (2008)
(discussing statutory multiple damages when determining the question of
punitive damages in the maritime law context); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d
1353, 1355–56 (Me. 1985) (looking to statutory multiple damages when
examining Maine punitive damages law).
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punitive damages. 484 Other major federal multiple statutes are
RICO, false claims, and antitrust. 485
Support can be found for punitive policies. 486 One court held
that “liquidated” or statutory damages are punitive, but that
recovery of interest is compensatory, so that recovery of both is
not duplicative. 487 Other support is on the fence between punitive
and “remedial” damages. 488 Some decisions identify “remedial”
damages. 489 By “remedial” courts seem to mean favoring the
private litigant instead of the public-law functions of punishment
and deterrence. 490 The Supreme Court said that Congress may
have enacted multiple damage statutes to arm private plaintiffs
as private attorneys general to vindicate the statute’s policy
because of scarce prosecutorial resources. 491 Closing the circle, a
court said that human rights act treble damages are
compensatory. 492 In Killough, the Court of Appeals said that

484. See Halo Elecs. v. Pulse Electronics, 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935–36 (2016)
(noting that willful and “egregious”” misconduct may permit the court to award
enhanced damages); Christopher Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and
Enhanced Damages After In Re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV.
417, 422 (2012) (noting the potential impact of enhanced damages in patent
remedies).
485. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963–64 (2012) (establishing civil and criminal
penalties for RICO violations); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012) (establishing liability
and penalties for FCA violations); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (establishing antitrust
penalties).
486. See Genty v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 910 (3d Cir. 1991)
(discussing Congress’s intent behind RICO); Bryan T. Camp, Dual Construction
of RICO: The Road Not Taken in Reves, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 61, 80–81
(1994) (discussing punitive and remedial purposes underlying RICO penalties).
487. See Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 755 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding
prejudgment interest and liquidated damages to be not duplicative).
488. See E. Thomas Sullivan, Antitrust Regulation of Land Use:
Federalism’s Triumph over Competition, The Last Fifty Years, 3 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 473, 506 n.178 (2000) (citing lower court cases that found treble damages
to be remedial).
489. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240–
41 (1987) (discussing RICO’s remedial purposes).
490. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143,
151 (1987) (noting the pressure on “private attorneys general”).
491. See id. (discussing the aims of two multiple damages statutes).
492. See Convent of the Visitation Sch. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 707 F. Supp. 412,
416 (D. Minn. 1989) (noting statutory language to this effect).
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purpose of doubling and forfeiture in the False Claims Act was to
reimburse the cost of investigation and litigation. 493
Finally, in Rex Trailer v. United States, 494 the Supreme
Court dealt with a statutory penalty plus doubling for
defendant’s violation of the Surplus Property Act after World
War II. 495 The Court used “restitution” in a quotation to describe
compensatory damages; it equated multiple damages with
liquidated damages; and it hinted in a footnote that unjust
enrichment was also involved. 496
Multiple damages for commercial bribery are based on
several policies: to punish, to deter, to compensate for the
plaintiff’s hard-to-prove loss, to encourage private litigation, and
to unwind the defendant’s unjust enrichment. 497 But an observer
may inquire whether multiple damages are, on balance, a wise
and balanced solution.
VI. Principled Choice and Measurement Decisions
After surveying the possible smorgasbord of defendants and
monetary remedies, we will attempt some legal theory and
jurisprudential generalizations about choice and measurement of
remedies. 498 The parties to a bribe are not trying to help the
future plaintiff when they engage in an intentional, bad-faith
wrong. Their misconduct may, but may not, cause the agent’s
principal to lose. Commercial bribery, in addition to being a
crime, leads to monetary civil remedies, wage forfeiture,
493. See United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1534 (1988) (“Forfeitures
and double damages recompense the government for costs of the investigation
and litigation as well as the actual monetary damage incurred because of the
defendant's fraud.”). But see Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 800 (2000) (describing the trebled damages imposed after
the 1986 FCA amendments as “essentially punitive in nature”).
494. 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
495. Id.
496. See id. at 151–53 (examining the Surplus Property Act’s remedies
provisions).
497. See supra notes 465–496 and accompanying text (providing examples of
different policy justifications for imposing multiple damages).
498. See infra notes 500–549 and accompanying text (discussing various
legal theories of distributive justice and how to measure remedies).
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damages-restitution, often measured by the bribe, both legal and
equitable restitution, and multiple and punitive damages. 499
Legal theory examines the bipolar question of “yes” or “no,”
usually not the more nuanced remedies questions of choice and
measurement. Our analysis modifies a framework based on
variations of Professor Cooter’s three-part economic and policy
based analysis of categories of substantive standards leading to
remedies. Cooter names these categories: first, a liability right,
more accurately and hereafter a right to compensatory damages;
second, a right to disgorgement or restitution; and, third,
punitive damages, called disgorgement-plus. 500
First, if a defendant has breached a compensatory damages
rule, then—surprise!—the court will award that plaintiff
compensatory damages. Compensating the plaintiff’s loss, Cooter
posits, means that the court sets the plaintiff’s recovery at a level
to allow the defendant’s activity to continue but also to deter
similar potentially harmful activity because it forces the
defendant to internalize its activity’s full cost. 501
The compensatory damages rule covers defendant’s
negligence and breach of contract. Commercial bribery, as
discussed above, breaches the employment contract, but it is also
an independent tort-type of intentional misconduct. 502 An
example of compensatory damages in commercial bribery is the
plaintiff’s recovery of lost profits. In legal theory, corrective
justice unwinds an improper transaction; it requires the
wrongdoer to compensate the victim. Corrective justice applies to
giving-back restitution, for example, when the bank has
mistakenly deposited money in the defendant’s account. By one
way of looking at it, an owner’s property is involved and the bank
never stopped owning the money. Corrective justice focuses on
499. See supra notes 48–53Error! Bookmark not defined. and
accompanying text (explaining the various consequences, both civil and
criminal, of commercial bribery).
500. See Robert Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic
Analysis, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 76–77 (1997) (examining the purpose
and effects of legal punishments).
501. See id. at 77 (discussing incentives and deterrents in compensatory and
prohibitive damages structures).
502. See supra notes 67–87 and accompanying text (discussing the basis of
liability for commercial bribery).
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the wrongdoer’s repair of remedial duties. Helpful for
compensatory damages and giving-back restitution, 503 corrective
justice does not explain nominal damages, punitive damages, or
giving-up restitution.
Corrective justice explains some, but not all, remedies for
commercial bribery. Measuring the principal’s compensatory
damages by the amount of the bribe is inaccurate and
incongruous with the idea that a plaintiff must prove damages.
In addition, a commercial bribery plaintiff can seek restitution.
Second, in Cooter’s analysis, suppose the defendant breached
a standard with what he calls a “disgorgement” or restitution
measure. 504 The court will measure the plaintiff’s recovery to
force the defendant to disgorge all of her gains to the victim. 505
The defendant’s forced payment to the plaintiff will arguably
deter repetition by making the defendant, and other potential
defendants, reconsider whether they should begin or continue
any misconduct.
The reason giving-back restitution does not work in
commercial bribery is that nothing exists for the defendant to
“return” to the plaintiff. The bribe flowed from the briber to the
bribee without ever resting with the plaintiff. Giving-up
restitution enters here because the recipient benefitted from the
bribe unjustly. The court can measure the bribed agent’s
restitution by the amount of the bribe. It can name the
restitution as money had and received, accounting-disgorgement,
or constructive trust. Measuring what the briber pays to the
principal by the amount of the bribe is more difficult to explain.
Often in restitution, the defendant should give up an asset
that the plaintiff has not lost. The most difficult example is the
bribee’s return on investment when the bribe is invested and
makes a profit. 506 The Supreme Court required a bribe recipient
503. See Katy Barnett, Distributive Justice and Proprietary Remedies Over
Bribes, 35 LEGAL STUD. 302, 306 (2015) (discussing corrective justice).
504. See Cooter, supra note 500, at 76–77 (describing disgorgement as part
of a three-category remedies survey).
505. See id. (“‘Perfect disgorgement’ is a sum of money that leaves the
injurer indifferent between the injury with liability for damages or no injury.”).
506. See Harding, supra note 285, at 33–34 (discussing the contested
question of whether a fiduciary holds such a non-diverted gain on constructive
trust for the plaintiff, when that constructive trust is formed, and whether she
must “account for her gain by way of a personal remedy”).
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to account for everything taken, exceeding the amount traced and
the amount of the plaintiff’s damages. 507 Professor Harding
justified “the fullest possible disgorgement” for bribery: “the
value of trusting interpersonal relationships and guaranteeing
the trustworthiness of trustees and fiduciaries and moral
injunctions against using other people.” 508 Surrendering the
bribe, in addition to profits generated from the bribe, to the
plaintiff makes the defendant reconsider repeating the
misconduct, finances the plaintiff’s litigation, and creates an
incentive for the plaintiff to enforce the norm; it prevents and it
redresses.
The chief distinction between the compensatory damages
and restitution is that compensatory damages respond to the
plaintiff’s loss, while restitution responds to the defendant’s gain.
Although both are said to deter, if disgorgement-restitution
exceeds compensatory damages, restitution will be the greater
deterrent.
Civil-recourse theory posits that when someone commits a
legal wrong, the victim is entitled to a remedy to hold the
wrongdoer to account to satisfaction, vindication, and redress. 509
Oriented to explaining liability more than the remedy and its
measurement, civil-recourse theory helps explain compensatory
damages but also nominal and punitive damages, restitution, and
disgorgement of unjust gains.
Distributive justice is another approach to giving-up
restitution disgorgement. 510 The principal never owned a bribe,
so a property-based approach falls short. There is no transaction
to reverse, nothing to return. The defendant’s disgorgement of
the bribe is distributive justice.
Professor Katy Barnett maintains that distributive justice
principles justify a court in imposing a constructive trust for a

507. United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 317 (1910) (summarizing the
costs owed by the bribe recipient, which included “whatever gains, profits or
gratuities” he received).
508. Harding, supra note 285, at 34.
509. See John C.P. Goldberg, Inexcusable Wrongs, 103 CAL. L. REV. 467, 503
(2015) (“Tort law is largely about victims' rights: the right of potential victims
not to be injured, and the right of actual victims to respond to their injury.”).
510. See generally Harding, supra note 285, at 24–26, 30, 31–33, 34.
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bribe. 511 Distributive justice requires the court to make a moral
judgment about which party deserves the property. To choose
between the three remedies of equitable lien, accounting, and
constructive trust, she subscribes to a discretionary remedial
constructive trust based on the court’s analysis of dessert, needs,
and equality. 512 A court, she maintains, should award a
commercial-bribery plaintiff a constructive trust because that
“claimant deserves the property more than any other person who
may have a claim to it.” 513 She regards the need to find a
plaintiff’s pre-existing property interest as a legal fiction that
prevents the court from admitting that it is redistributing the
defendant’s profit to the plaintiff. 514
Barnett writes that tracing the bribe to third parties
prevents a defendant from “laundering” the money and deters
future bribes. 515 Decisions about deterrence should be contextual,
depending on the facts of each case. For this purpose, a
discretionary remedial constructive trust is superior to a
proprietary constructive trust. 516 Barnett confirms the position I
took above on the remedial constructive trust.
Applying Barnett’s analysis, a constructive trust plaintiff
should outrank a third party in the trust res unless the third
party is a bona fide purchaser. 517 A constructive trust also
captures the trust res’s gain in value for the plaintiff. Because
the defendant’s creditors are not wrongdoers, however, Barnett
favors a personal judgment for an accounting instead of a
constructive trust when the defendant is insolvent. 518
511. See Barnett, supra note 503, at 306 (“The claimant deserves the
property more than any other person who may have a claim to it.”); see also
Harding, supra note 285, at 35 (explaining that responses to breaches of duties
by distributive justice in cases of non-diverted gains often hinges on the
argument that the fiduciary’s breach may be grounds for disgorgement via
“allocation tout court” by division according to a “norm of distributive justice”).
512. Id. at 306–07.
513. Id. at 306.
514. Id. at 315–16.
515. Id. at 320 n.115. For further discussion of deterrence, see Harding,
supra note 285, at 35.
516. Barnett, supra note 503, at 320.
517. Id. at 303–04.
518. See generally id. at 312–13 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 61 (AM. LAW INST. 2011)).
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Cooter’s third category, punitive damages, is the plaintiff’s
recovery
that
exceeds
compensatory
damages
and
restitution-disgorgement. 519 The court responds to the
defendant’s aggravated misconduct by imposing punitive
damages on the defendant to punish and deter a potential
defendant’s intentional wrongdoing. With punishment, criminal
justice policy re-enters. In comparing restitution with punitive
damages, a court will mete out and measure both restitution and
punitive damages to deter the defendant’s profitable misconduct
by taking the defendant’s benefit or profit. The policy bases are
not identical. The court awards a plaintiff restitution to deter and
to prevent or reverse the defendant’s unjust enrichment.
Nevertheless, disgorgement-restitution has a punitive quality. 520
The court imposes punitive damages on a defendant to
punish and to deter that defendant and others from misconduct.
The court has separate reasons to give punitive damages to the
plaintiff; these include to pay the plaintiff a bounty for bagging a
miscreant, to finance the plaintiff’s expensive litigation, to
obviate private revenge, and to award the plaintiff concealed
compensation, perhaps for losses under- or un-compensated by
compensatory damages measures. 521
Punitive damages may be appropriate for commercial
bribery. Defendants intentionally breached a specific duty to act
in the best interest of the plaintiff—an identified person.
Defendants’ concealed intentional misconduct, based on greed for
illicit profit, comprises commercial bribery. Also, commercial
bribery is usually a crime—a public wrong. The retributive
policies associated with criminal punishment appropriately lead
to punishment beyond compensating the victim. Three
restatements with scholarly approbation support punitive
damages with restitution in appropriate cases of defendants’
aggravated wrongdoing. 522
519. See Cooter, supra note 500, at 77 (explaining that punitive damages
are both “extra-compensatory” and “extra-disgorging”).
520. See Mark Gergen, What Renders Enrichment Unjust, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1927, 1934, 1964 n.181 (2001) (noting that, in utilitarian terms, disgorgementrestitution serves a deterrent purpose because of its punitive nature).
521. See generally Rendleman, Common Law Punitive Damages, supra note
452, at 7.
522. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(b) (AM.
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Along the moral continuum, labeling a defendant’s
misconduct as criminal is more serious than labeling it as a tort
accompanied by punitive damages. For one thing, the civil
procedure leading to punitive damages is less demanding than
criminal procedure; for another, the criminal label’s consequences
and stigma are more opprobrious. 523
Once we examine the categories above and seek to align the
rules with policy justifications, we notice that observers’ views of
the appropriate function of civil remedies diverge. 524
Deterrence is cited as a policy justification for every remedy
we have examined; compensatory damages, disgorgementrestitution, and punitive damages. “When you want to stop the
others from doing something they would otherwise do, that is
deterrence.” 525 A short examination of deterrence will illuminate
commercial bribery policies.
Bribery may be deterred by legal and remedial rules because,
based on the defendants’ greed, bribery is intentional, calculated
in advance, and involves two or more people. Commercial bribery
is a crime in most states in addition to a civil cause of action.
Like most property crimes, commercial bribery is planned.
The basic goals of torts are compensation, deterrence, and
morality-corrective justice. 526 Under Judge Learned Hand’s
formulation in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 527 the
LAW INST. 2015); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 51 cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (citing Ward v. Taggert, 336 P.2d 534 (Cal.
1959)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY §§ 8.01 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2006);
NICHOLAS MCBRIDE, RESTITUTION FOR WRONGS IN THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT: CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE ESSAYS 251,
259, 265 (Charles Mitchell & William Swadling eds., 2013). See also Smith,
Fiduciary Relationships, supra note 70, at 622 ((“[T]aking away the profit that a
person makes from a transaction is not a logical way to deter them from making
such profitable transactions. A properly designed deterrent has to go beyond
that.”).
523. See Goldberg, supra note 509, at 501 (discussing wrongdoing in the
criminal and tort context).
524. For an in-depth consideration of this divergence, see Jeff Berryman,
Nudge, Nudge, Wink, Wink: Behavioural Modification, Cy-Pres Distributions
and Class Actions, 53 SUP. CRT. L.R. 133, 134–39 (2011).
525. AVINASH DIXIT & BARRY NALEBUFF, THE ART OF STRATEGY: A GAME
THEORIST’S GUIDE TO SUCCESS IN BUSINESS AND LIFE 183 (2008).
526. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 100, § 10.
527. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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measure of compensatory damages that a plaintiff receives for
the defendant’s negligent tort sets the amount that the defendant
and other potential defendants in the future should spend on
prevention. 528 A defendant is negligent when the damages, the
magnitude of the risk calculated by considering both how
probable and how severe the plaintiff’s injury is, exceeds the cost
or burden of risk prevention. 529
The goal of disgorgement-restitution is to prevent or reverse
defendant’s unjust enrichment. This measure deters by taking
the defendant’s benefit and may lead to plaintiff’s recovery that
exceeds compensation.
Punitive damages for a defendant’s aggravated tort add
punishment and deterrence. They are a deadweight loss to the
defendant in addition to and unrelated to the plaintiff’s
compensatory damages.
Deterrence looks forward to future incentives to behave or
misbehave. It stems from a rational-actor view based on law and
economics. 530 A potential wrongdoer will calculate depending on
the probability of detection and the penalties or costs including
shame and reputation. 531 If enforcement mechanisms
demonstrate a credible ability to impose costs, deterrence
calculations convince its target that prospective costs outweigh
prospective benefits.
Professor Rose-Ackerman discusses using the criminal law to
deter bribery. 532 Bearing in mind that commercial bribery is also
a crime, her analysis begins, “An offence should be treated as a
civil matter if society wishes to trade off the benefits to the
perpetrator against the costs.” 533 A potential participant in
bribery should face a penalty that equals or exceeds her gains
calculated in consideration of the probability of her being found

528. See id. at 173 (discussing a formulaic approach to the duty of care).
529. Id.
530. See Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181,
181–203 (2011–2012) (arguing that tort liability serves as a clear warning sign
to rational actors in the marketplace).
531. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 20, at 222.
532. See id. at 223 (“To deter bribery, at least one side of the corrupt
transaction must face penalties that reflect its own gains.”).
533. Id. at 221 n.4.
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out. 534 The penalty should exceed the benefit. When the chance of
detection is less than 100%, “to properly deter, the penalty should
be a multiple of the gain to the firm.” 535 Criminal “penalties for
bribers should not be tied to those costs unless they are a good
proxy for the briber’s benefits.” 536 The briber’s gains are a better
proxy than the bribe. 537 As Professor Rose-Ackerman explains:
Once one takes the costs of prevention into account, the level
of deterrence expenditures should be set where the net
benefits are maximized, that is where marginal benefits equal
the marginal costs. A higher level of deterrence would not be
worth the extra costs, a lower level would sacrifice the net
benefits of increased enforcement. 538

Some undetected bribery will occur, but the court’s response
sanction should be stiff.
Yet deterrence calculations may often be ineffectual. Its
effects are difficult to locate and pin down. Because deterrence of
this defendant and other potential defendants casts its effect into
the future, it is imprecise to measure. Deterrence succeeds when
nothing happens; this leads to difficult calculations about cause
and effect. 539 What caused nothing to happen? What does
inaction mean? Is it lack of intent or intent that lapsed? Is it
perhaps a fear of a sanction or something unrelated to
deterrence’s threat? Honesty, training?
Fiduciary law, Professor Sherwin maintains, is based on a
strong deterrence policy. 540 “Breach of fiduciary duty,” Professor

534. See id. at 223 (arguing those convicted of bribery should be penalized a
multiple of their gain).
535. Id. at 225.
536. Id. at 224.
537. See id. (“To have a marginal effect, the penalties should be tied to the
briber's gains (their excess profits, for example), not to the size of the bribe.”).
538. Id. at 225.
539. See generally LAWERENCE FREEDMAN, STRATEGY: A HISTORY 159 (2013).
540. See EMILY SHERWIN, FORMAL ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT AND FIDUCIARY
LAW IN CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 16 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S.
Gold eds.) (forthcoming 2017) (“Strong deterrence is necessary because even a
well-meaning fiduciary may be subtly affected by self-interest, and also because
the beneficiary of the relationship typically is not in a position to monitor the
fiduciary’s behavior.”).
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Friedmann wrote, “constitutes perhaps the most conspicuous
area of application of deterrent principles to restitution.” 541
On the other hand, Professor Lionel Smith eschews
deterrence as a justification or policy in fiduciary law. 542
Fiduciary law, Smith writes, has no deterrent function; not
instrumental, fiduciary law is based in the normative
structure. 543 Business entities, market participants, and
insurance carriers that are conscious of potential liability
implement preventive measures to prevent or deter casualties.
Careful businesses check references, and train and monitor
employees. 544
Professor Gary Schwartz’s thorough study found only
moderate deterrence in torts, mostly negligence, treated sector by
sector. 545 The economic model that compensatory damages deter
has mixed success in actually altering potential defendants’
conduct. Fine tuning, Schwartz concluded, will not reach perfect
deterrence. 546 Professors Cardi, Penfield, and Yoon used
experimental surveys of law students to yield a negative answer
to their title’s question “Does Tort Law Deter?” 547 Looking at the
other end of the remedial spectrum, Professor Anthony Sebok
rejected the argument that deterrence justifies punitive damages.
541. Friedmann, supra note 361, at 553.
542. See Smith, Fiduciary Relationships, supra note 70, at 627 (arguing for
the inadequacy of deterrent theories).
543. Id. at 628 n.81; see also, Barnett, supra note 503, at 306, 310–11, 320
(maintaining that deterrence in constructive trust depends on context).
544. See generally Popper, supra note 530, at 181–203.
545. See Gary T. Schwartz, Realty in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law:
Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 378–79 (1994) (finding that
tort law provides some deterrence, but considerably less than economic models
generally estimate).
546. See id. (“Given the imprecision in the processes by which tort liability
affects behavior, these efforts at fine-tuning, though intellectually challenging,
are likely to be socially irrelevant.”); see also Daniel Shuman, The Psychology of
Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 43 (1994) (disagreeing with
basing torts on deterrence because “proof that the tort system deters with any
degree of precision has not been made”); Linda Mullenix, Ending Class Actions
as We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 400,
418 n.82 (2014) (registering skepticism about deterrence because of the lack of
empirical support). See generally Jonathan Cardi et al., Does Tort Law Deter? 9
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 567, 567–603 (2012).
547. See generally Cardi, supra note 546, at 567–603.
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Retribution—punishment—is, in Sebok’s view, the better
justification. 548
The rational actor view of deterrence, which dominated
criminal policy making and sentencing decisions, has faltered
recently. Professor Ulen defected from the economic analysis idea
that potential criminals compare benefits with consequences
discounted by the probability of avoiding detection. 549 The
rational actor model may have an uncertain impact on bribe
payers and recipients. Rational choice theory may not predict the
behavior of those most in need of deterrence. Instead, commercial
bribery occurs because of over-confident people who know
commercial bribery is wrong but are not risk-aversive. 550
What the New York court said in Walker v. Sheldon551 about
punitive damages to deter fraud is, with bracketed interpolation,
instructive about courts’ views of deterrence of commercial
bribery:
Exemplary damages are more likely to serve their desired
purpose of deterring similar conduct in a fraud [bribery] case,
such as that before us, than in any other area of tort. One who
acts out of anger or hate, for instance, in committing assault
or libel, is not likely to be deterred by the fear of punitive
damages. On the other hand, those who deliberately and coolly
engage in a far-flung fraudulent [bribery] scheme,
systematically conducted for profit, are very much more likely
to pause and consider the consequences if they have to pay
more than the actual loss suffered by an individual plaintiff. 552
548. See generally Anthony Sebok, Normative Theories of Punitive Damages:
The Case of Deterrence, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS
(John Oberdeik ed., 2014).
549. See Thomas S. Ulen, Skepticism About Deterrence, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
381, 397 (2014) (describing criminals as overly optimistic about their chances of
success). Former federal district judge, Shira Scheindlin, replied to her own
inquiry whether “the length of the sentence deter[s] people outside the
courtroom from committing crimes?” that “Over time, I came to believe it is a
fiction.” Shira A. Scheindlin, I sentenced criminals to hundreds more years than
I wanted to. I had no choice., WASH. POST, (Feb. 17, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/02/17/i-sentenced-criminalsto-hundreds-more-years-than-i-wanted-to-i-had-no-choice/ (last visited Mar. 6,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
550. Id. at 403.
551. 179 N.E.2d 497 (N.Y. 1961).
552. Id. at 499.
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A student writer concluded that the employer’s civil
remedies are inadequate; the “basically ineffectual” remedies’
“negligible deterrent effect” show the need for stern criminal
measures. 553 Examining the court’s choice of remedies for
commercial bribery, Barnett maintained that a potential
constructive trust instead of a money judgment is a refinement
that will not deter the parties to a bribe. 554
Working with policies of compensation, reversing unjust
enrichment, deterrence, and punishment is difficult because of
the blurred and subjective borders between them. In State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 555 the Supreme
Court quoted a Comment in the Restatement of Torts for the idea
that compensatory damages for a plaintiff’s emotional distress
already contain a punitive element: “In many cases in which
compensatory damages include an amount for emotional distress,
such as humiliation or indignation aroused by the defendant’s
act, there is no clear line of demarcation between punishment
and compensation and a verdict for a specified amount frequently
includes elements of both.” 556 Nevertheless, the same Court
explained in Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group 557 that
“compensatory damages and punitive damages . . . serve distinct
purposes”; 558 while “[t]he former are intended to redress the
concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the
defendant’s wrongful conduct, . . . [t]he latter, which have been
described as ‘quasi-criminal,’ operate as ‘private fines’ intended
to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing.” 559
Indeed, as the Court put it more bluntly in State Farm,
“[punitive] awards serve the same purposes as criminal
penalties.” 560
553. Commercial Bribery: The Need for Legislation in Minnesota, supra note
36, at 604.
554. See Barnett, supra note 503, at 306 (considering the effects of a
constructive trust).
555. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
556. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
557. 121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001).
558. Id. at 1683.
559. Id.
560. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 538 U.S. at 417.
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Although the policies of compensatory damages, restitution
and punitive damages differ, courts seldom distinguish the
remedies based on their policies. When they do distinguish, it
may be for a reason divorced from awarding a remedy. An
example of the latter occurred in Texas. Dealing with a
constructive-trust judgment debtor’s supersedeas bond on appeal,
the court distinguished compensatory damages, punitive
damages, and disgorgement-restitution as well as costs, interest,
and attorney fee to apply a statute that required a bond only for
compensatory damages. 561
Restitution and compensation overlap. Restitution of the
give-it-back variety equals compensatory damages. In addition,
the remedies and policies overlap. In 2015, a federal judge wrote
that trademark infringement for an accounting is based on
policies of deterrence, unjust enrichment, and compensation, the
latter because defendant’s profits, in addition to unjust
enrichment, may be a “proxy” “rough measure” that can measure
plaintiff’s damages. 562 The disgorgement restitution we are
examining exceeds the plaintiff’s compensatory damages, which
may not exist at all. If the line between compensatory damages
and punitive damages is fuzzy, the line between restitution and
penalty is unfortunately blurred. 563 “I concede,” Professor
Partlett wrote, “that it [is] not always easy to distinguish
retribution from deterrence, particularly when courts use loaded
retributive rhetoric. This is certainly the case with punitive
damages.” 564
561. See In re Longview Energy Co., 464 S.W.3d 353, 360–61 (Tex. 2015)
(rejecting constructive trust as unrelated to any recognized form of damages);
see also Mansik & Young Plaza, LLC v. K-Town Mgmt., LLC, 470 S.W.3d 840,
843–44 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (finding that attorney fees are not compensatory
damages and are therefore not part of Texas supersedeas bond).
562. See generally Black & Decker Corp. v. Positec USA, Inc., 118 F. Supp.
3d 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
563. See SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(“In the insider trading context, courts typically require the violator to return
all profits made on the illegal trades, have rejected calls to restrict the
disgorgement to the precise impact of the illegal trading on the market price.”).
564. David Partlett, Remedies in a Wide-Angle Lens; Observations on
53,
62
(2014),
Remedial
Concilience,
63
EMORY L.J. ONLINE
http://law.emory.edu/elj/elj-online/volume-63/responses/observations-remedialconcilience.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); see also Roach, supra note 95, at 282–83, 347 (“stacked” remedies,
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The legal-realist view I have taken in this Article is
process-oriented and eclectic; it considers compensation,
deterrence, punishment-retribution, corrective justice, normative
articulation, and civil recourse theory as overlapping and, as
such, relatively compatible. 565 A court deciding between two
remedies needs a sense of proportion and context to avoid excess
and overlapping remedies. When I sensed that the law tended to
excess above, I posed a question to focus on the potential. A court
setting punitive damages should take counsel from the multiple
statutes that doubling, at most trebling, suffices.
VII. Conclusion
I am not sure that the preceding analysis, featuring rule and
policy complexity, overlapping remedies, grey areas, and
unanswered questions would dispel my Remedies students’ fog
that launched it. The simple commercial bribery that
transmogrified into an advanced, but mini, course in Remedies
may leave them still muddled; but, I aspire to have stimulated
analysis on a more advanced plane. Aligning policy with rule,
remedy, and result turns out to be an inconclusive quest even for
their professor. Tort, contract, employment, fiduciary, and agency
policies are not always congruent, leading from contort to choices.
The boundaries between the remedies overlap and leave
contested grey territory open to adversary argument and judicial
characterization. Moreover, the categories are founded on
multiple policy justifications and feature primary, secondary, and
overlapping justifications. Observers question basic premises.
The overarching policy of deterrence leads to questions of
whether and how accurately legal rules deter and, if so, how
much to deter. What take-home points can we posit?
My advice for Beyer or another bribery victim comes from
the 1209 “crusade” against the heretic Albigensians in southern
France. When “the papal legate was asked should Catholics be
spared, he answered, ‘Kill them all, for God knows His own.’” 566
punitive damages plus forfeiture and compensation, can be excessive).
565. See generally Schwartz, supra note 545.
566. WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION: THE AGE OF FAITH 775
(1950).
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My advice to a commercial bribery plaintiff is to take the legate’s
advice. Sue both the bribe giver and the recipient. Include other
wrongdoers or recipients because a constructive trust allows the
plaintiff to trace the bribe to third persons. Allege both breach of
contract and torts, breach of fiduciary duty and interference with
contract. If a multiple-damages statute may cover the case, add
another count. Demand compensatory damages, punitive
damages, legal restitution money, had and received, equitable
restitution, a constructive trust and an accounting, along with
multiplied recovery and attorney’s fees. The court “knows His
own.” 567
Taking a broader perspective than a lawyer maximizing a
client’s interest, the court should identify, locate, and measure
the parties’ just desserts. A court should strive to match a legal
rule or remedy with its policy justifications. 568 Our comments
above should dispel some of the substantive and remedial cloud
that shrouds commercial bribery. Precedent decisions will reduce
uncertainty. 569
My tentative recommendation on Beyer’s recovery from
Aggie and Sailer follows for the entertainment and edification of
readers who have studied their peculations. Aggie turns the
$8,000 bribe over to Sailer as restitution for breach of her
fiduciary duty. Sailer’s obligation to Beyer for his tort of
interference with contract is in the $5,000 to $15,000 damages
range. Do the defendants get off too lightly? The stripped-down
hypothetical lacks sufficient facts and context to evaluate
whether the court might impose punitive damages on these
intentional wrongdoers.
The human factor is crucial in decision making. As Professor
Tim Dare wrote:
No matter how carefully we construct our systems of rules and
principles, cases inevitably arise in which we are unsure
which rule applies, in which we want to make an exception to
an applicable rule, or in which we think an apparently
567. Id.
568. See generally EISENBERG, supra note 63, at 26–37.
569. See Mason, supra note 353, at 258 (“If the present trend continues, the
element of uncertainty which is associated with the greater emphasis on good
conscience will be dissipated by an increase in the number of decisions on a
wide range of fact situations.”).
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inapplicable rule should after all be applied in a particular
case. In such cases, judgment or practical wisdom is required
if we are to obtain the benefit of general rules and principles
without paying the considerable costs threatened by their
mindless application. 570

Bringing the money remedies for commercial bribery forward
exposes the risk of excess. Professor Sherwin contrasts fiduciary
to contract law. The fiduciary remedies, she shows, are stricter
than the contract remedies. 571 In particular, courts dealing with a
breaching fiduciary impose maximum liability with no equity
default or safety valve and but one exception, apportionment. 572
Potential excess lurks in speculative compensatory damages,
restitution unchecked by policy, duplicated recovery, punitive
damages, and multiplied recovery. The court needs to overcome
justified disapprobation for the defendants’ misconduct and, like
Goldilocks, pick enough but not too much porridge from the
remedial smorgasbord. The court’s equitable discretion and
principles of confinement should stem from careful fact-finding,
examination of the commercial and individual contexts, a sense
of proportion, and clear identification of the policies.

570. See generally TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES?: A DEFENSE OF THE
STANDARD CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE 155–56 (2009).
571. See EMILY SHERWIN, supra note 540, at 2 (“Contract law . . . has
resources that allow courts to announce, determinate, seemingly absolute, rules
but make exceptions at the enforcement stage . . . . Fiduciary law responds with
a combination of broad standards of behavior and concrete prophylactic rules,
all backed by strict rules of enforcement.”).
572. See id. at 19 (“There is one way in which courts may make allowances
in a fiduciary’s favor in compelling cases: the effect of a disgorgement remedy
may be tempered by apportionment of gross profits between the fiduciary and
the beneficiaries claiming breach of duty.”).

